coalition an unanticipated opportunity for rapid policy change through the inside channels of administrative and judicial directives. But as a price; the liberal creed of a color-blind Constitution had to be disavowed by the very forces that had carried its banner to triumph under Lyndon Johnson. It was a unique burden, born of unique circumstances, and apparently impossible to overcome.

Sentiments, Ideas, and Animals
Rights Talk and Animal Protection

James M. Jasper

For several hundred years sympathy for nonhuman species has grown at an accelerating rate in the Western world, culminating in today's animal rights movement. One of the most energetic protests in Reagan's America, this protest effort can hardly be understood through the lens of self-interest, since activists and their beneficiaries, far from overlapping, are not even members of the same species. This level of compassionate altruism can only be understood through the ideas and moral visions of the protectors. Only a major shift in worldview could lead to such an extensive and radical effort to change age-old relationships between humans and other species.[1]

Although the effects may be clearest in a movement such as animal rights, all social movements are based, at their deepest level, on inchoate moral intuitions—"structures of feeling," in Raymond Williams's apt phrase. A given cluster of intuitions may be held by a majority or a minority in a society. A small number of intellectuals articulate these sentiments in explicit ideas and ideologies, which moral entrepreneurs can then deploy in recruiting participants. The best ideas are normally those that act as symbolic lightning rods, resonating in numerous ways with common underlying sentiments. If the organizers can stir up sufficient outrage, anger, or fear, they may ignite a protest movement. Such dynamics have typically been overlooked in social scientific research, on the assumption that in the long run people follow their own (usually material) interests or on the restrictive definition of social movements as efforts by outsiders to gain access to the political system.[2] The time has come to

recognize that people also pursue changes simply because they feel these are morally just.

A single cluster of moral intuitions forms the basis both of the humane tradition in animal protection, which arose in the mid-nineteenth century and has persisted since, and of the more radical animal rights movement, which arose in the 1970s. But the formal articulations of these underlying sentiments differed, leading to contrasting tactics and goals in the two movements. Even today, there are other ideologies and languages of critique that could have taken the animal protection movement in a different direction. Specifically, the current focus on the rights of individual animals could instead have been a more environmental concern for ecosystems and species.

Sentiments of Compassion

Throughout most of their history, humans have treated animals in two simultaneous ways: as resources to be exploited at will, but also as pets to be treated with love and care. They have tenderly nurtured their lambs, then slaughtered them. They have doted on their pet dogs, while stuffing cats into burlap sacks and setting them afire at carnivals. This balance between two attitudes, one instrumental and the other sentimental, has shifted in the countries of the industrializing West during the past several hundred years, with sentimental feelings toward animals gaining hegemony.

New ideas about nonhuman species have roots in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, when there emerged a distinct middle class whose experiences were shaped by towns rather than by agriculture. This new commercial milieu accelerated what Norbert Elias called the "civilizing process" through which Europeans learned concern for the sensibilities of others; no longer did they spit on the floor, blow their noses on their sleeves, or eat out of common bowls.[3] One result of this growing awareness of unique individual identities and emotional needs was that children were no longer seen as small adults, but as beings to be cherished and protected. In a process of "sentimentalization," love and affection rather than economic need came to be the glue holding the family together.[4] In the paintings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, families and interior spaces began to replace the crowd scenes and public places of artists like Peter Brueghel.

Pets became part of the new bourgeois family and home, often appearing in family portraits. By the early eighteenth century, many people were giving their pets human names, burying them and writing epitaphs for them, and occasionally leaving them legacies. Except for cart and carriage

horses, town dwellers lost more and more instrumental contacts with animals. They hunted less, had fewer fields to plow, and raised fewer animals to slaughter (the longest lasting exception being a few chickens). Their main contact with animals was now with their pet dogs. As a result they were less likely to see animals primarily as resources, existing to serve economic ends. Animals could still fulfill important emotional needs for humans, however, providing love and loyalty. In a long process extending from the sixteenth century to the present, compassion replaced cruelty as the acceptable stance toward animals.[5]

Beginning in the eighteenth century scientific developments also contributed to a revaluation of animals. Naturalists developed classifications based on similarities between humans and animals. Geologists studied the age of the earth and speculated about the evolution of complex species. The Comte de Buffon and others searched for the missing link between humans and apes. The capstone of this process was Charles Darwin's 1871 publication of *The Descent of Man,* which supported the growing belief that humans and animals were descended from common ancestors, with all the similarities that implied. Darwin wrote *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* to demonstrate the common physiological source of emotions across species, insisting that human mental capacities were superior in degree but not in kind from those of animals.[6]

This rethinking of animals accelerated in nineteenth-century Britain and the United States, spreading across social class boundaries. With nature neutralized for many by industrialization and the growth of cities, reduced to a suburban garden and a pretty landscape painting, people could romanticize it as innocent and good, ignoring its cruelty and violence. Animals, accordingly, were seen not simply as like humans in their emotional capacities, but as superior. They were never duplicitous or unkind. They were innocent and helpless, perfect objects for compassion.

Nineteenth-Century Articulations

This sentimental attitude toward animals was common enough by the nineteenth century in Britain and the United States to inspire political efforts to protect animals. Victorians articulated their feelings by linking kind treatment of animals to a range of other moral virtues. Kindness toward dogs and horses (affection for cats lagged) was a training ground for kindness to other humans, as the multiple meanings of "humane" imply. Victorian elites were particularly critical of lower-class amusements, such as bullbaiting, but also of the cruel treatment that carriage horse drivers gave their animals (the only instrumental uses of animals

they still saw regularly). Animal protection was merely one aspect of the moral improvement of mankind, part of a cluster of middle-class causes that included child protection, moral reform, and temperance. Reformers hoped that, "by the discouragement of cruelty and insensibility of heart, in the treatment of inferior creatures, human beings will be rendered more susceptible of kind impressions towards each other, their moral temper will be improved, and consequently, social happiness and genuine philanthropy must, infallibly, be strengthened and enlarged."[7]

The animal protection movement of the nineteenth century developed to pursue this vision. In 1822, the British parliament passed a bill protecting draft and farm animals from unnecessary cruelty, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was formed to help enforce it. The movement focused on ending cruelty largely through education of children and the lower classes; the drivers who whipped their horses were the main target of SPCA enforcement efforts until horse-drawn transportation began to disappear in the twentieth century. The movement was explicit in its efforts to impose middle-class morals on the working class.

The humane movement arrived in America after Henry Bergh, son of a wealthy New York shipbuilder, observed especially cruel treatment of carriage horses during a diplomatic assignment to Saint Petersburg in 1863–64. Returning to America via London, where he attended a meeting of the SPCA, he decided to devote himself to defense of the "friendless dumb brute." He formed an American SPCA in New York and by 1900 no fewer than seven hundred similar groups had been formed nationally. Their paternal attitude toward animals as defenseless objects of compassion was aptly captured in the title of the Massachusetts SPCA publication, *Our Dumb Animals*. Capable of devotion and emotional warmth, but lacking thoughts or awareness of their own, the best situation for pets was to be cared for in loving human families. As in London, the groups saw themselves as a "humane and civilizing charity," devoted to preventing pain to animals, but also to disseminating the values associated with the upper classes.

In the United States and Britain, humane societies had uneasy relations with antivivisectionists. The British RSPCA ("Royal" was added at Queen Victoria's approval) briefly attacked vivisection, but this strategy was controversial among its members and it dropped the cause after mild restrictive legislation was passed in 1876. In both countries antivivisectionists—often from the lower classes—were attacking one of the important idols of the era, scientific progress, and they found little support among upper-class humanitarian groups. In its nineteenth-century articulation, animal protection did not extend to laboratories, which were coming to be associated (by the end of the century) with the same process of moral improvement that animal protection supposedly fostered. Despite a brief flirtation, animal protection and antivivisection remained separate causes until their new articulations in the 1970s and 1980s.

Recent Articulations

In recent years, the moral intuitions supporting animal protection have, if anything, grown stronger. Urbanization and industrialization have continued, with only 3 percent of contemporary Americans working in agriculture. Pet owning has continued to expand so that 60 percent of American households now have pets. The personification of these animals continues, as people often project onto their animals suspiciously human tastes. They buy their dogs mink stoles, bottled water, and vegetarian, low-cholesterol food. Pets receive orthodonture, plastic surgery, pacemakers, even CAT scans. Humans treat their "companion animals" as full members of the family: talking to them, carrying their photos, celebrating their birthdays, and even sharing their beds.

There has been one additional twist since the days of Henry Bergh, however. Extensive scientific research on animal communication and cognition has filtered into public awareness. We watch a gorilla named Koko use primitive forms of sign language to interact with human researchers. We listen to tapes of haunting and complex whale songs. We read about the ways that birds use different song patterns for different purposes. We now appreciate animals for their intelligence as well as their loyalty, and our sympathy has expanded to incorporate "intelligent" species such as whales and dolphins as well as cuddly, loving ones such as dogs and cats. Animals are no longer "dumb brutes." The natural sciences have blurred the boundaries between humans and other species even further.[8]

The biggest difference between the recent movement and its nineteenth-century precursor, though, is in the explicit ideas derived from the compassionate sentiments. Beginning in the early 1970s, philosophers articulated several kinds of claims for the protection of animals. In his 1975 book *Animal Liberation*, Peter Singer provided a utilitarian argument, carefully avoiding the concept of rights.[9] Because animals are capable of feeling pain, humans have a moral obligation to weigh animals' pain against humans' pleasure derived from their use. The dreadful lives of animals in "factory farms," for instance, should outweigh human pleasures in meat eating. Animals may be used in experiments, but only if the likely

benefits are high and only if humans are also considered as potential subjects. Severely retarded humans, the argument goes, may be capable of less pleasure in their lives than many intelligent nonhuman mammals. To automatically give every human priority over every nonhuman, no matter what their comparative potential for pleasure and pain, is "speciesism," a mistake parallel to racism and sexism. Singer thus provided an epithet, a rational argument, and extensive evidence of animal suffering in laboratories and farms. He implicated modern societies' central institutions in the abuse of animals, transcending the humane movement's focus on aberrant cases of individual cruelty.

In a 1983 book *The Case for Animal Rights,* Tom Regan went further than Singer, arguing that animals had natural rights similar to those of humans and therefore should not be used as a resource at all, no matter what the possible benefits to others. Even though animals are not themselves moral actors, they have inherent worth as living creatures, "subjects" in control of their lives. In his words, "It is not an act of kindness to treat animals respectfully. It is not 'the sentimental interests' of moral agents that grounds our duties of justice to children, the retarded, the senile, or other moral patients, including animals. It is respect for their inherent value."[10] Developing a true "rights" position, Regan claimed that "they, like us, have a value of their own, logically independently of their utility for others and of their being the object of anyone else's interests" (p. 384). Inherent worth does not come in degrees; an animal either has it or does not.

Singer and Regan both made antivivisection central to their programs. By grounding animal protection in the characteristics of animals rather than in human capacities for sympathy, they cast doubt on the freedom of scientists to do what they wish with animals. They criticized as "instrumentalism" the reduction of living beings, whether humans or animals, to the status of tools for researchers. In contrast to the uneasy nineteenth-century relationship between animal protection and antivivisection, the two now became inextricable.

Not only scientific research but every human interaction with animals—even well-intentioned ones—could now come under scrutiny. Some clearly involved suffering, such as trapping and hunting, modern methods of raising chickens or veal calves, and the Draize test, in which substances are tested in the eyes of white rabbits. Others were offensive primarily because they did not seem "natural": zoos, carnivals, and other displays of animals; vivisection with anesthetics; even horseback riding and the keeping of pets. Pet owning, the ideal of the humane movement, was attacked as a form of fascism, necessarily involving dominations.[11]

The rights discourse, not the utilitarian one, prevailed in the contemporary animal protection movement, lending it its name. Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights* is a dense philosophical treatise that few in the movement have read. In contrast, Singer's *Animal Liberation,* easy if gruesome reading, has been extremely influential in attracting converts to animal rights—but for its evidence of abuse not for its philosophical arguments. Indeed protectors avoid Singer's utilitarian language in favor of rights talk. They routinely refer to Singer to buttress their arguments for animal rights, even though he avoids the language of rights and, according to Regan, does not even provide coherent philosophical support for the rights of animals. Activists commonly attribute Regan's arguments about rights to Singer. In the United States, at least, people feel more comfortable with political arguments phrased in terms of individual rights.

The rights discourse proved effective for building the contemporary animal rights movement. In the United States, activists founded hundreds of groups in the early 1980s, and membership in these groups soared, especially in the late 1980s. As many as one million people joined explicit animal rights groups, in addition to the millions supporting traditional humane organizations. The new groups are a diverse lot. At the more radical end of the spectrum groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), which began in Britain but was soon imported to the United States, favor sabotage and laboratory break-ins—which have not only "liberated" animals but also yielded notorious videotapes showing experimenters in an unfavorable light. Even activists within the movement debate whether such tactics help or hurt the movement's public image. Staying with legal tactics, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the United States' largest animal rights group with several hundred thousand paying members, deploys many tactics, especially those involving media attention. For example, it sponsored a "barf-in" at the headquarters of cosmetics giant l'Oreal; protectors pretended to vomit into a large papier-mâché toilet because animal testing "made them sick." Older organizations, like the Humane Society of the United States, founded in 1954, have also grown more radical under the influence of new groups and ideas, although they continue their traditional practices of lobbying and education. Diverse groups pursue diverse goals using diverse tactics.

Rights Talk

Appeals to rights have become a reflex in American society at least since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Groups have organized to defend the rights of fetuses, children, prisoners, future generations, and animals. People

claim the right to life, the right to die, the right to privacy, and the right to know. All these claims are represented as bedrock moral imperatives: compelling, unassailable, and beyond negotiation. Every group claims "oppression" if it is prevented from doing what it wishes—even when that desire is owning guns or distributing pornography. In the United States moral claims are inevitably framed in the language of rights, even when the rhetoric of rights is simply a strategic means to present particular interests as compelling moral claims.

All claims to rights must be grounded in higher, immutable principles of nature, of religion, or of traditional values. But what are the sources of these principles? In a world increasingly recognized as socially constructed, it is no longer possible to say convincingly, "We hold these truths to be self-evident." Religion is no longer universally accepted as a source of justice or truth. Nor does science any longer seem sufficient to legitimate moral claims, since scientific evidence is increasingly perceived as malleable and available for conflicting points of view. At least, most philosophers agree that rights claims cannot be proven. In fact, new rights claims are grounded in changing social practices and concrete situations and in the intuitions and articulated beliefs associated with them. When social and economic conditions change, they generate new standards of behavior. Long-standing practices may then come under attack, and such attacks are usually framed in the language of rights. Rights claims are, in effect, a moral barometer, reflecting public anxieties and social cleavages that develop in the social conditions of a given place and time. They may not be philosophically provable, but they are plausible to large numbers of people.

Thus it was natural for animal protectionists to turn to rights talk in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. It fits the sentimental individualism derived from the image of pets as family members. The language of rights leads in turn to a radical extension of protection efforts to ever more species (since there are no obvious boundaries for deciding which species have rights and which do not) and to more urgent tactics. Yet animal protectionists in other countries have not embraced the cry of rights so thoroughly (Regan is American, Singer Australian). Are other frameworks possible?

Alternative Formulations

The individualistic rights formulation was hardly the only way that animal protection claims could have been articulated. Several philosophers have pointed out problems with Regan's rights ideology.[12] In particular, there is no single trait or ability one can point to as making an animal worthy of rights: the ability to feel pain, to communicate, to plan one's life, to have a self-image? All of these are important, and all come in varying degrees. The more that a species or individual has, the more worthy of rights it is (and humans score highest on most measures).[13] But there is no absolute boundary, only more and less. Singer draws the line between a mollusk and a crustacean, on the basis of ability to feel pain. Regan can only appeal to our lack of certainty to give the benefit of the doubt to frogs and other species whose mental lives are opaque to us.

British philosopher Mary Midgley outlined an alternative in a brilliant but seldom read book called *Animals and Why They Matter* in 1983.[14] Dismissing "rights" as "the really desperate word," better as a political slogan than a philosophical principle, she said that the challenge for animal protectionists was redrawing the group boundary (which the concept of rights does not help us do), not deciding what rights to grant those within it. "Speciesism" is not really parallel to racism, since knowing the race of a human is irrelevant for how you will treat her or him, while knowing the species of a nonhuman is absolutely crucial for how to treat it. The best rationale for helping animals, she concluded, may be old-fashioned compassion. That we are different from other species does not prevent us from sympathizing with them, especially since humans and domesticated species have lived together for thousands of years, becoming mutually dependent in every possible way. Love for animals is perfectly appropriate. Midgley thus avoided Regan's need to speculate on the mental life of animals or to identify with them.

Midgley's position involves a more critical anthropomorphism than most activists demonstrate, admitting that there are similarities but also important differences between species. We are encouraged to discover what the differences are, so that we can learn how to treat each species properly. Rather than personifying animals, she encourages us to appreciate their diversity. "Critical anthropomorphism" of this kind could even link scientists and animal protectionists in common cause.

Midgley's formulation also provides a way to distinguish between the treatment of domestic and wild animals. Domesticated animals are part of a "mixed community" with humans; because they are already under our control, we bear considerable responsibility for their good treatment. We have bred them for thousands of generations to be our companions. But wild animals live by their own rules. For them, the best we can do is to refrain from destroying their habitats.

This opening to environmentalism is significant, for it provides an alternative vision of the treatment of animals in the wild. As the environ-

mental movement developed during the 1970s, it elaborated a pantheistic view of the sacred integrity of nature and the fragile balance of plant, animal, and human life—an idea reaching its extreme in the "Gaia hypothesis" that the earth itself is a kind of organism capable of healing and self-regulation.[15] In this ecological vision, plants and animals had inherent value independent of their utility, simply because they were part of this system. Their value did not rest on their rights as individuals, but on their contribution to habitats, ecosystems, and balances between species.[16]

Animal rights groups, in contrast, believe that all animals deserve equal rights regardless of their place in nature. Aside from a tendency to focus on cute or humanlike animals (furry, intelligent, with humanesque facial features) for purposes of fund-raising, the movement literature draws few distinctions between species. It does not distinguish between animals that are "renewable" and those that are endangered; equally egregious are experiments on artificially bred mice and those on monkeys captured in the wild. Similarly, in targeting fur coats, the animal rights activists do not distinguish animals trapped in the wild from those raised on ranches. An ecologist, in contrast, would emphasize such distinctions. Those concerned with preserving species, after all, may destroy individual animals that threaten the survival of a herd; the ecological balance of certain communities may require the killing of animals. Many environmentalists criticize animal rights activists for treating wild animals as though they were domestic, whereas different rules should apply to the two categories. If animals were granted rights to live full lives without interference, then humans could justify meddling in the wilderness to protect animals from many predators. The deer's right to life can be violated as easily by a mountain lion as by a human hunter, after all. The concept of rights for animals becomes absurd at this point. The contrast between saving individual animals and saving species has precluded much cooperation between the two protest movements.[17]

Another problem with the current rights framing is that, given present laboratory technologies, the rights of animals occasionally do conflict with life-and-death human issues. The urgency of the AIDS epidemic, for example, would seem to demand that every avenue of research be explored; absolute rights for animals might well slow progress. This recognition that there may be tradeoffs between life-giving discoveries and the rights of animals is a popular source of resistance to the movement. Midgley's compassionate stance, like Singer's utilitarian one, would allow the sacrifice of animals in cases, like these, where there are clear or very likely benefits.

Conclusion

There are many complex steps from moral intuitions to protest activities, especially a compelling ideological articulation and organizers to act upon it. The complexity of the links, however, hardly proves that the ideas and intuitions are not important in rousing political action. Even when these moral visions are not camouflage for material interests, they are effective. Protest has many motivations and symbolic sources, despite the efforts of social scientists to reduce it to elegantly simple models. Ideas and moral visions matter.

Intuitions and ideas not only help create protest, but direct its choice of targets and tactics. Some ideological formulations may lead to tactical errors. Is the individualism of rights talk, for example, a dead end? A misguided way to articulate sincere and persistent moral sentiments? Will the animal rights movement suffer because it is clear to many people that, when expressed as absolute moral rights, the rights of humans and those of nonhumans may indeed occasionally clash? Alternative formulations, I have argued, are available. A regrouping of the movement could allow a new articulation, one based on compassion for domestic animals and an ecological approach to wild ones. It will be interesting to see how persistent current formulations prove to be.

Sentiments, Ideas, and Animals

1. For further details on animal protection movements in the United States, see James M. Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin, *The Animal Rights Crusade* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

2. The major traditions of recent social scientific explanations of social movements all tend to overlook the motivating power of ideas. Rational choice approaches such as Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1982), tend to reduce human motivations to simple material interests and dismiss many others as "extra-rational." Resource mobilization approaches such as Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1973), and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977) pp. 1212–41, sometimes do the same, adding an analysis of the organizations that protectors form to pursue their interests. Political process approaches add the insight that groups must first fight to participate in the system: Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), and Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). In all these works, there is little recognition of the collective construction of interests and goals. For a critique, as well as an effort to bring in culture and emotions, see James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

3. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (New York: Pantheon, 1978). Increased awareness of individual feelings led both to more refined table manners and to a greater need for privacy. Servants who once had slept in the same room with their masters were now put in another wing or floor of the house; children were given their own rooms.

4. See Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), and Viviana Zelizer, *Pricing the Priceless Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1985; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

5. Several historical works on uses of and attitudes toward domesticated animals in Western Europe include James Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast: Animals, Pain, and Humanity in the Victorian Mind* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Keith Thomas, *Man and the Natural World* (New York: Pantheon, 1983); Yi-Fu Tuan, *Dominance and Affection: The Making of Pets* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); James Serpell, *In the Company of Animals* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986); and Harriet Ritvo, *The Animal Estate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

6. Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (New York: D. Appleton, 1896); and George Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, *Natural History: General and Particular* (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1812).

7. These are the official words of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, quoted in Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, p. 55.

8. Popular works include Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, *How Monkeys See the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Donald R. Griffin, *Animal Thinking* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Griffin, *Animal Minds* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); R. J. Hoage and Larry Goldman, eds., *Animal Intelligence: Insights into the Animal Mind* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986); Eugene Linden, *Apes, Men, and Language* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1974); Linden, *Silent Partners: The Legacy of the Ape Language Experiments* (New York: Times Books, 1986); and Stephen F. Walker, *Animal Thought* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).

9. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York: New York Review of Books Press, 1975). He had worked out many of these ideas in "Animal Liberation," *New York Review of Books*, April 5, 1973, and "All Animals Are Equal," *Philosophical Exchange* 1 (Summer 1974): 103–16.

10. Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 280. Also see Regan, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 5 (1975): 181–214; and *All That Dwell Therein: Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

11. For critiques of pet ownership, see George Cave, "Up from the Roots," *Between the Species* 4 (Summer 1988): 221–29; and Jim Mason, "For the Pleasure of Their Company," *The Animals' Voice* 3 (1990): 25–27.

12. Mary Anne Warren, "Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position," *Between the Species* 2 (Fall 1986): 160–79; and Josephine Donovan, "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," *Signs* 15 (1990): 350–75.

13. Alan Wolfe compares the mental capacities of human and nonhuman species in "Social Theory and the Second Biological Revolution," *Social Research* 57 (Fall 1990), concluding, "To a surprising degree, other animal species can communicate, choose between alternatives, manipulate signs, recognize themselves in mirrors, and follow rules that allow other species besides their own to live alongside them." But they lack "the capacity . . . to define for oneself what a rule might mean" (p. 631).

14. Mary Midgley, *Animals and Why They Matter* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983).

15. See J. E. Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

16. See Christopher Stone, *Should Trees Have Standing?* (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufman, 1974), on the rights of trees. For similar arguments, see Christopher Stone, *Earth and Other Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987); Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature Mattered* (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1985); Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Mark Sagoff, *The Economy of the Earth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and J. Baird Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

17. Efforts by *The Animals' Agenda*, which changed its subtitle to "Helping Animals and the Earth," and by many individuals within the animal rights movement to build bridges to environmentalism have not succeeded.

Ideas, Ideologies, and Social Movements

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