

October 23, 2008

Dear Politics and Protest Workshop members,

I would like to begin with an apology for the length of this paper. It was originally a dissertation chapter that I am trying to turn into an article for publication. The chapter was largely ethnographic and the comparative cases were introduced later. I am wondering if the two sections fit together or if it is better to develop them into separate papers?

The issues I need feedback on the most, but not exclusively, are:

1. Do I need to spend more time defining trust networks?
2. Do I need to elaborate on the mechanisms community members use to respond to external threats?
3. Is my distinction between German and Japanese-Americans clear? Is the comparison of German and Palestinian-Americans convincing?
4. Do I need more evidence?

Finally, what type of journals should I be targeting with this piece? (this goes back to the original question, is this one or two papers?)

Thank you for reading

Sincerely,

Randa Serhan

*A community on the brink:
Palestinian-Americans make sense of 9/11 across generations*

“Before the attacks of September 11, we used to be happy. They used to leave us alone...now everything is bad”- Khalid, first generation, 2003

To Khalid, a first generation Palestinian-American, September 11 ruptured relations between Palestinian-Americans and their government. Many in his community in New York and New Jersey share this sentiment. Yet, depending on one’s vantage point, either the first or the second half of Khalid’s statement is naïve. Activists and some scholars would tell Khalid he is misinformed and cite numerous tensions between Palestinian-Americans and their social and political surroundings since 1967 (Abraham and Abraham, 1981; Abraham, 1994; Akram and Johnson, 2004; Fischbach, 1985; Hagopian, 1976; 2004; Shaheen, 1984; Shain, 1996; Stockton, 1994). At the other end, conservative politicians and commentators would remind him of the government’s prudence since 9/11 (Bok, 2003; Malkin, 2004; Palmer, 2006; Pipes, 2001; WND, 2004).

Each approach is correct to the extent that it views the situation through a narrow lens. Activists are highly cognizant of all instances of persecution and prosecution against other activists, mainly Palestinians and those connected to the Palestinian issue. Yet, they ignore the majority who were politically inactive, and had lived a fairly quiet existence in the U.S.¹ Conservatives within the U.S. are cognizant of the coercive capabilities of the government, but ignore the constitutional and legal precedents that inhibit the government from over-reaching its powers². In other words, those on the Left want additional curbs on the government, while those on the Right want more power at the discretion of the government. The battle they are locked in demonstrates the extent of progress made in the democratic process, yet tells us very little about the micro-level dealings and interpretations by those most affected by the post-9/11 change in the political milieu.

These camps are “political entrepreneurs” using the political moment to push forth their own agendas and images of what the U.S. nation should look like. Their work is important in that it sheds light on the activities of the government, how much and what types of control it is exercising at any moment in time (Tilly, 2005). Thus a comparison to previous eras is essential to contextualize the government’s policies since 9/11. Many commentators have invoked Japanese-American internment during World War II to argue for or against the current policies. As one would expect, those on the Left warned against the possibility of Arab and Muslim-American internment; and those on the Right

¹ This is not to downplay the significance of those cases of persecution or violation of rights. One might even argue that these cases deterred any overt identity politics or mobilization by the Palestinian immigrant (weaker) majority.

² Conservatives are not ignorant of the legal changes, but justify their call for additional coercive measures because of the crisis (America is at war).

advocated internment's benefits (CBS, 2003; Clemetson, 2002; Lipton, 2004; Malkin, 2004; Muller, 2001; Pierre, 2002; Saito, 2005; Volpp, 2001; 2002; Watanabe, 2007).

I would add the treatment of German-Americans during World War I to the comparison for it provides insight beyond the Japanese-American case on government policy and racialization in the United States. World Wars I & II, and 9/11 were three episodes in history when the U.S. was attacked and drawn into war. In all three instances, the government was "dragged into" the war and responded swiftly to protect its citizens and destroy its enemy. Yet, in all three instances, the perceived "enemy" was also a member of the nation, which raised the issue of loyalty. German-Americans were treated with suspicion, and Japanese-Americans were interned for the duration of the war. The situation was more complex after 9/11, because the attacker was a non-state entity and the terrorists were of several nationalities. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center left 2,752 dead, countless families grieving, and a population shaken (Hirschhorn, 2003). This led to more diffuse government policies both internationally and domestically in what has been described as an "endless war." A broader net was cast, which has meant that more than one national group was targeted and brought together under the rubric Arab-Muslim and the potential "enemy within."

As Arab and Muslim, Khalid's community came under the purview of the government and dramatically withdrew from the public sphere after September 11, 2001. The last major rally attended by members of the Palestinian-American community in NY-NJ took place in October 2001. It appeared they had permanently removed themselves from the public domain, until they re-emerged in July 2006 for a march across the Brooklyn Bridge in support of Palestinians and Lebanese during the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian territories and Lebanon. Before July 2006, it would have appeared that Palestinian-Americans, like the German and Japanese-Americans, dismantled as a publicly distinct community. The latter point will be clarified subsequently.

Even if we accept this as the eventual outcome, two important questions arise from this conclusion: Did German-Americans and Japanese-Americans completely disappear as distinct cultural groups? And how were the responses received and negotiated between the first and second generations (born and raised in the US)? The government treated native born and foreign-born members of the communities differently, and one would assume the responses varied at the other end.

The historical literature contemplates these issues, but cannot provide definitive conclusions with the secondary materials it relies on. A common explanation is that the disappearance from political life was a result of "normal" assimilative processes, each new generation moves further away from the ancestral homeland, losing both connections to it and proficiency in its language (Bergquist, 1999; Daniels, 2000; Dobbert, 1967; Gross, 2004; Muller, 2007; Yoo, 1996). Another perspective proposes that the detachment was less voluntary, because the populations withdrew to avoid sanctions (Holian, 1996; Tolzmann, 2000; Wilcox, 1993; Wittke, 1936). Perhaps it is a combination of both, but difficult to ascertain. In the German case, it has been documented that the second generation were never interested in Germany and in the Japanese case, it has been suggested that the second generation worked against the first generation in collaboration with the US government (Bergquist, 1999; Child, 1938;

Daniels, 2000; Dobbert, 1967; Grodzins, 1955; Malkin, 2004; Muller, 2007). But the evidence is scant for both.

In the Palestinian-American case, these questions can be answered more fully. The situation is ongoing and my ethnographic fieldwork dates back to shortly before the terror attacks. From 9 a.m. on September 11, I began recording the negotiations between the first and second generations over community responses. The present article is an attempt to trace the processes that initially created disagreements between the two generations before bringing them closer together in identification and reaction. The argument will be developed in three parts: 1. An analysis of the German and Japanese-American cases in comparative perspective; 2. An overview of the Palestinian-American community's relation with the government prior to 9/11 and its composition as a *trust network*; 3. The negotiations between the first and second generations as they formed their responses to government policies. The first two segments provide context, while the third informs the bulk of the analysis on the disappearance and partial reappearance of Palestinian-Americans in the public domain.

Sample and data collection

My research began two weeks prior to the terror attacks. The initial query was on the place of adolescent females in a seemingly traditional West Bank Palestinian community raised in the United States. My focus remained narrow for several months until I realized that the young women did not share my concerns about attaining greater independence from the community, and that the entire community was undergoing rapid adjustments to the changes in their surroundings post-9/11. Both the first and second generations found that the ways they conducted their daily affairs were no longer sustainable.

My primary method of data collection was participant-observation in the Palestinian-American community in New York and New Jersey between August 2001-December 2007 (although I remain in contact with the community as of the writing of this article). This community is fairly young, having formed after and in response to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. Accurate figures on the size of the community, or Palestinian-Americans in general, are unavailable because many entered the U.S. with Jordanian passports or Israeli documents, and they are classified as white on the census³ (AAI, 2006; Cainkar, 1999; Orfalea, 2006). According to the estimates provided by the Arab American Institute (AAI), the official organization entrusted with census data assessment on Arab-Americans, there are 16,945 Palestinians in NY-NJ-PA (AAI, 2003; Census, 2004). Community estimates for New York and New Jersey are 50,000 each. Obviously, the discrepancies are great between the official and the local estimates. Palestinians entered the United States under numerous legal categories (Israeli, Jordanian, Lebanese, or another country). Also, recent census data is inaccurate because there is a distrust and unwillingness to identify as belonging to certain Arab ancestries (AAI, 2006; Cainkar, 2008). It is impossible to ascertain the exact figures, but one would assume they lay between the two extremes.

³ The same holds true for all Arabs. For a discussion of the legal progression of this classification see Samhan, Helen. (1999). "Not quite white: Race classification and the Arab-American experience," in Suleiman, Michael (Ed.), *Arabs in America: Building a new future*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Snowball sampling was used to trace the networks of my original contacts in New Jersey, which led me to New York. I also used conferences and community events to enter new networks and volunteered at an Arab-American association in Brooklyn. Eventually, I had access to people of different ages, migration dates, and socioeconomic statuses, collectively allowing me to form a comprehensive depiction of the community. Since the connections between New York and New Jersey are quite dense, I will often refer to the community in general without specifying where the speaker is from.

German-Americans

At the outbreak of World War I, German-Americans were an established and numerically substantial segment of the population. There were 8,282,618 individuals of German ancestry, according to the 1910 census, constituting roughly 10% of the U.S. population. Just over 2 million were German-born and the remainder were US-born second generation and beyond (Tolzmann, 2000; Wittke, 1936). They had bilingual schools, German language presses, churches, associations, and neighborhoods (Bergquist, 1999; Dobbert, 1967; Rippley, 1976; Wilcox, 1993). The National German-American Alliance was formed in 1901 to promote German-American relations (Dobbert, 1967; Rippley, 1976; Tolzmann, 2000). The Alliance was most active during prohibition and at the inception of the war prior to U.S. involvement. The Alliance and German-language newspapers mobilized to encourage the government to maintain its neutrality (Child, 1938; Wittke, 1936).

In 1917, the Senate approved President Wilson's declaration of war on Germany ending the U.S.'s stance of neutrality after Germans sunk three American vessels (Child, 1938; Rippley, 1976). German language newspapers quickly changed their tone to support the government and the Alliance did the same, however these gestures were insufficient to ward off a backlash (Bergquist, 1999; Wittke, 1938). Mobs attacked German businesses, homes, schools, and German-Americans who were suspected of disloyalty (Capazzola; 2002; Ellis, 1997; Gross, 2004; Holian, 1996; Tolzmann, 2000; Wilcox, 1993). A series of laws were enacted between 1917-1918 targeting "enemy aliens" and disloyal citizens: the Espionage Act, Trading with the Enemy Act, Sedition Act, and legislation to ban enemy aliens from living close to arms factories (Capazzola, 2002; Vaughn, 1979).

None of these legal stipulations were worded to target any ancestry in particular, and while 500,000 German aliens and 3-4 million Austro-Hungarians were required to register with the government, very few arrests were made (Rippley, 1976; Wittke, 1936). The 100 percent Americanism movement took off and German books were sold for waste paper, German language newspaper were shut down or boycotted by distributors, German classes turned into Americanization classes, and German-language professors investigated (Bergquist, 1999; Ellis, 1997; Rippley, 1976)⁴. German-Americans dropped the hyphen; some Anglicized their names, and stopped using German in the streets.

⁴ At the University of Michigan, half of the German department was dismissed within one year. See: Wilcox, Clifford. (1993). "World War I and the attack on professors of German at the University of Michigan," *History of Education Quarterly*, 33 (1), 59-84.

However, none of these measures were government driven. Investigations of academics were organized by the equivalent of “Campus Watch” today- a private initiative- with access to alumni boards (Wilcox, 1993). A Princeton professor and head of the National Security League, a non-governmental association, called for the banning of German because “it was part of a culture that ‘prides itself in its inhumanity [that] murders children, rapes women, and mutilates the bodies of innocent men’” (Ellis, 1997, p. 201).

Most of the offenses came by way of mob behavior that culminated in the lynching of a German-American prompting President Wilson to publicly admonish such acts (Capazzola, 2002). Nonetheless, voluntary vigilante associations, such as the American Protective League, were established with the support of the government. The American Protective League that had between 200,000-250,000 volunteers throughout the country (Ripley, 1976; Wittke, 1936). Apparently, no one was convicted for spying but the tone had been set. Throughout this period, German-Americans continued to enlist in the armed service (Child, 1938; Ripley, 1976; Tolzmann, 2000). By 2000, 15% of the U.S. population identified themselves as having German ancestry making them the largest self-reported ancestry group, yet some observers note they are culturally invisible (Bergquist, 1999; Holian, 1996)⁵.

Japanese-Americans

Unlike those of German ancestry, Japanese and their American-born children did not enjoy much prominence prior to World War II. The Gentleman’s Agreement between the US and Japan in 1908 de facto ended Japanese migration to the US (Hatamiya, 1993; LeMay, 2006). Japanese were barred from naturalization, numbered 126, 948 according to the 1940 census, and were concentrated in California and neighboring states (Muller, 2007; Tamura, 1999). In addition, when quotas were included in the 1924 Immigration Act, the Japanese were banned altogether (Hane, 1990; Grodzins, 1955; Muller, 2007). The FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence compiled a list of suspicious individuals, mainly community leaders and educators, who were to be arrested in time of strife (Daniels, 2000; Muller, 2007).

Suspicion was articulated in the following terms in November 1941, there are “still Japanese in the United States who w[ould] strap the dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves” (Muller, 2007, p. 15). Although this was perceived as the rare exception, some military leaders felt it was impossible to separate the bad from the good; those born in Japan were deemed “enemy aliens” but the difficulty was in deciphering allegiance among those born in the U.S. (Daniels, 2000; Murray, 2000; Muller, 2007)⁶.

⁵ Bergquist made the observation based on the 1990 census, but the same applies to 2000).

⁶ There was a belief that Japanese-Americans who spent at least four years studying in Japan had loyalties to the emperor that superseded their allegiance to the U.S. The distinction was so prominent that there were different terms to describe U.S.-born Japanese educated in Japan, who were known as Kibei, and those educated in the U.S., who were termed Nisei. Since, both were American-born, there was no systematic measure to distinguish the two and the Nisei ended up interned as well (Hatamiya, 1993; Muller, 2004; Murray, 2000).

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This brought the issue of loyalty to the forefront and the government quickly responded. Within a week all those who were on the suspect list were interned, and Japanese homes were searched and individuals questioned (Daniels, 1993; Murray, 2000; Spicer and Hansen, 1969). Military officials in the War Department declared that regardless of place of birth, the “Japanese race is an enemy race...the racial strains are undiluted” (Grodzins, 1955, p. 570; Muller, 2007, p. 17)⁷. The final blow came from Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the alleged mastermind behind internment in historical texts, who purported that “a Jap’s a Jap” and that “Emperor-worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed into the Japanese war chest from the contributions freely made by Japanese here” (Hane, 1990, p. 570; DeWitt, 1943).

Within days of this report, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 authorizing the military to remove civilians from California and neighboring states (Daniels, 1993; Hatamiya, 1993; Murray, 2000). The order did not specify Japanese, but only Japanese and Japanese-Americans were ordered to leave. Three months later, between 110,000 and 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry were evacuated by the military from the West Coast to relocation centers in middle states (Daniels, 1993; Derrick, 1947; Spicer and Hansen, 1969; Yoo, 1996). There were ten relocation centers surrounded by barbed wire and security guards (Daniels, 1993; Derrick, 1947; Grodzins, 1955; Malkin, 2004; Starn, 1986). Internees left behind their land and belongings, although the War Relocation Authority acted as an agent to facilitate the sale of property (Hatamiya, 1993; WRA, 1943). Two-thirds of the internees were American citizens (Hane, 1990; Muller, 2007). Public opinion polls found that the general population did not differentiate between those born in Japan and the U.S.-born. 75% of the population reported that they would not hire individuals of Japanese ancestry, and two-thirds felt all Japanese and Japanese-Americans should be sent to Japan (Patten, 1945; Grodzins, 1955). Within the relocation centers, cleavages were reported to have arisen between the first and second generations, whereby the latter were more cooperative with government authorities (Muller, 2007; Spicer and Hansen, 1969).

An association known as the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL) with 8,000 members was reportedly the primary government ally, espousing its agreement with the internment and the need to ban all Japanese language classes. JACL monitored camp activities, lobbied for military enlistment, and assisted in administering the “loyalty questionnaire” in 1943⁸ (Hatamiya, 1993; Muller, 2007). Eventually, 23,000 second-generation Japanese-Americans served in segregated units in the military (Daniels, 2000).

⁷ The media also played a role in fueling the antagonism by depicting a foreign culture with a foreign religion, whose allegiances were with an enemy power. Walter Lippman was quoted to have explained the absence of conflict by Japanese in the U.S. as “a sign that the blow is well organized, that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect.” (Hane, 1990, p. 571).

⁸ The loyalty questionnaire, specifically questions 27 and 28, asked non-citizens if they would serve in the U.S. army and denounce any allegiance to the Emperor. Lawyers and scholars interpreted this as effectively asking Japanese non-citizens to become stateless. Approximately, 10,000 individuals failed the test of which 5,589 renounced their citizenship and returned to Japan in order to secure their freedom. Years later, most of them were able to regain their citizenship through the courts (Tamura, 1999). Much has been written about questions 27 and 28 on the loyalty questionnaire, which caused the most confusion and became a point of contention in subsequent legal battles. For a broader discussion see: Daniels, 2000; Hane, 1990; Hatayima, 1993; Muller, 2007).

The internment of Japanese-Americans has been recorded as a blotch on American history. John L. DeWitt was determined to be the culprit as author of internment. The government eventually apologized to Japanese-Americans and awarded them reparations (Christgau, 1985; Daniels, 1993; Muller, 2007; Murray, 2000; Tamura, 1999). The agreed-upon historical and political account is that Japanese-Americans were victims of racist fears and policies despite being assimilated (Derrick, 1947; Hatamiya, 1993; Murray, 2000; Yoo, 1996).

Palestinian- and Arab-Americans Prior to 9/11

Palestinians, alongside the more numerous Syrians and Lebanese, first migrated to the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. Historical texts refer to them as an ideal minority that was industrious and able to assimilate with ease (Ameri and Ramey, 2000; Katibah, 1937; Kayali, 2006; Marvasti and McKinney, 2004; Orfalea, 1988; Wallbridge, 1999). Yet, their presence only became visible after the Immigration Act of 1965, which removed national quotas for immigrants. This change came a year after the Civil Rights Act, when discrimination based on race, color, sex, and national origin was made illegal. In fact, the Civil Rights Movement changed ethnic groups' self-perceptions, made duality acceptable, and hyphenation expected (Alba and Nee, 1997; Brubaker, 2001; Glazer, 2004; Steinberg, 2001). Palestinians, and Arabs who were conflated with Palestinians, did not enjoy the same celebratory moment as other ethnic groups since this coincided with the 1967 the Arab-Israeli War. This is particularly relevant to the New York-New Jersey community, which was formed as new immigrants flowed into the region as a result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza at the end of the 6-day war.

Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou identify the reception immigrants received upon arrival as one of the main indicators of their ability to incorporate successfully into American life⁹ (2005). West Bank Palestinians' arrival followed the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The media, which sided categorically with Israel against all Arabs and, according to most scholarship on Arab-Americans, made these new immigrants feel less than welcome (Abraham, 1981, 1994; de Boer, 1983; Hagopian, 1976; Shaheen, 1984; Stockton, 1994; Suleiman, 1994; 1999; Trice, 1978). Public opinion also reflected a lack of sympathy; in 1967, a Gallup Poll found that 56% of Americans were sympathetic to Israel, 4% to Arabs, 25% to neither, and 15% had no opinion (de Boer, 1983)¹⁰.

There was a similar convergence between the media and public opinion during World War II, but as Herbert Gans argues in *Deciding what's news*, the direction of the causal arrow is disputable (2004). Politically, the U.S. government used its veto power in the Security Council in favor of Israel and replaced France as Israel's main supplier of arms (Barringer, 2003; Stahl, 2004; Stork, 1974; Trice, 1978). However, domestically the government afforded Palestinian immigrants their full rights.

⁹ The other two factors effecting incorporation are the human capital immigrants bring (education and resources) and place of residence. West Bank Palestinian Americans largely came with various levels of human capital and moved into different neighborhoods, but the different effects are only visible at the individual level.

¹⁰ Arab and Palestinian were used interchangeably in these works.

Mobilized Palestinian-Americans established the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) in response to this political milieu (Abraham, 1994; Christison, 1989; Shain, 1996; Suleiman, 1999). Like the National German-American Alliance, its mission was to foster understanding between Americans and their ancestral home, albeit without the political clout. AAUG found its foes in pro-Israeli groups, but it continued to publish and advocate on behalf of Palestinians and Arabs until it withered in the late 1980s and closed its last office in Boston in 2000 (Orfalea, 2006). British-Americans had been German-Americans' greatest opponents in the propaganda war between the two populations during World War I (Bergquist, 1999; Child, 1938; Ellis, 1997; Wittke, 1936). The Alliance continued to publish and lobby until its legal existence was debated in congress, upon which it voluntarily dissolved (Ellis, 1997; Wittke, 1936). According to historical sources, only one German-American association came into existence for many years after the war and its purpose was to promote "good citizenship" (Ellis, 1997).

In the case of Arab-Americans, several organizations emerged after 1967 and have since disappeared. However, two have survived: the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Arab-American Institute (both will be discussed subsequently). These activists were predominantly in the second generation and beyond. This is in contrast to German and Japanese-American activists who seem to have been concentrated among the first generations. Arab students groups, comprised of both first and second-generation members, were also active on university campuses and their members were involved in altercations with pro-Israeli groups. Over the years, meetings were placed under surveillance and occasionally deemed "activists" were deported. However, these individuals were not targeted as Palestinian activists, but rather as members, allegedly, of communist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine under the McCarran Act of 1956 (Archibold, 2007; Caldwell, 2006). The number of cases are limited and frequently cited, and were not representative of the majority of Palestinian- or Arab-Americans organizing. The NY-NJ community lay largely outside the realm of activism having just arrived and not yet naturalized in the late 1960s/ early 1970s. According to the first generation in my study, they kept to themselves and lived in relative freedom. In 1990-1 and 1993, government surveillance increased during the first Gulf War and after the World Trade Center bombing respectively (Akram and Johnson, 2004; Shain, 1996). Gallup Polls during these periods found that in 1991, Arabs were associated with the terms: religious (81%), terrorist (59%), violent (58%); and religious fanatic (56%); and that two-thirds believed there were too many Arab immigrants in the US in 1993 (Jones, 2001). Yet, the government remained benevolent in their view. The second generation was too young to experience these episodes directly and remained unaffected until 9/11.

Limitations of comparison between the three cases

As the brief survey of the three cases demonstrates, nativist rhetoric echoed across the three eras, as did the government's condemnation of vigilantism. The nativist voices, as we saw, warned of an enemy within, potential suicide bombings, murderers, and a desire to sabotage the government (Ellis 1997; Malkin, 2004; Muller, 2007). The heads-of-state condemned the anti-immigrant panic. Like Woodrow Wilson's warning to

citizens during World War I about the government's intolerance of mob behavior, President Bush Jr. was quoted to have said, "those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don't represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind and they should be ashamed of this kind of behavior" (USDJ, 2001). Nevertheless, as noted previously, arrests, special registration, and instructions to report suspicious behavior were prevalent in each of the three periods.

All three administrations used coercive measures in varying degrees of intensity; the Japanese-American case unquestionably being the one where coercion was most comprehensive and severe. During World War I, people had been to hand in disloyal people on the trolley to the authorities; this was perhaps a precursor to the "if you see something, say something" signs in the subways since 9/11. *Coercion* is often the first response of a government in times of crisis to promptly contain and deter the threat; however according to Tilly's causal model in *Trust and Rule*, only weak states use it as the sole measure of controlling a population (2005).

The other two methods are *capital* and *commitment*. Capital, here, is both used as a resource to entice loyalty and as the power to tap into the resources of citizens. Commitment alternatively is based less on offerings and more on demands upon loyalty and accountability. In stronger democratic states, capital and commitment are more commonly implemented than is coercion. In World Wars I & II, the government relied on coercion and commitment, although the latter was reinforced by coercion. German-Americans had to publicly support the war against Germany and Japanese-Americans had to pass a loyalty test in order to be released from internment (Bergquist, 1999; Holian, 1996; Wittke, 1936). After 9/11, the government used direct coercion in a limited fashion nationally, which attested to its ability to implement other measures.

Another possibility is that the Japanese were more racially and legally identifiable than Germans and Arabs/Muslims. It is widely accepted that their geographic concentration combined with the racism of those in power made the Japanese case unique (Hatamiya, 1996; Muller, 2001; Yoo, 1996). One might think that since Japanese and many Palestinians and Arabs are of several different religions and racial stock from the majority, they would have shared a closer fate. Yet it was the German-Americans who shared more with post-9/11 Palestinian-Americans (among those from the Levant who do not have the stereotypical "Arab" features). Like Germans, they are widely dispersed across the United States, have had a long tenure (mainly Arab but not Muslim) in the country, and attained positions of influence in the government and economy¹¹.

There were some factors that distinguish Palestinian-Americans from the other harassed populations. First, they were never a source to contend with in comparison to German-Americans, who had numerical and voting clout. Second, there were not concentrated in a single region as the Japanese-Americans were. Third, the terrorist attacks were neither the doing of Palestinians nor were Palestinians the only ones implicated in the domestic "war on terror." Finally, the U.S. governments during World

¹¹ George Joulwan (NATO Supreme Allied Commander), John Abizaid (U.S. Central Command in Iraq), Spencer Abraham (U.S. Secretary of Energy), Doug Floutie (San Diego Charger), George Maloof, Sr. (owned NBA's Houston Rockets), Najeeb Halabi (former head of the FAA), Jacque Nasser (CEO-Ford Motor Company), Frank Zappa (musician), Edward Said (intellectual), and Dr. Michael DeBakey (invented the heart pump). For a more comprehensive list of prominent Arab-Americans, please see: <http://www.aaiusa.org/arab-americans/23/famous-arab-americans>

War I & II were less experienced and preceded the era of accepted duality of membership. If one considers the hate crimes that took place after 9/11, the victims were two Sikhs (neither Arab nor Muslim), a Copt (Arab but not Muslim), and a Hispanic man, it becomes evident that racialization was difficult except when names and businesses were identified as Arab or Muslim (HRW, 2002; Orfalea, 2006). Again, this is reminiscent of the German-American case when names, businesses, and language were targeted and people could conceal their ancestry in the public sphere (Johnson, 1999; Rippley, 1976).

These comparisons indicate that none of the controls- coercion, capital, or commitment (C,C &C)- exercised were innovations, and that the government's objective was to incorporate potentially "dangerous" populations. Admittedly, all three groups had been economically and legally incorporated prior to demonization once the government felt their ancestry interfered with full membership in the United States. Accepting that C,C&C were attempts at incorporation, the analysis can shift to the effects on the communities. At the outset, it was argued that the effects on the internal workings of the populations are unavailable for the German and Japanese-American cases, but they are available for Palestinian-Americans.

Palestinian-Americans as a Trust Network

NY-NJ Palestinian-Americans can best be described and understood as a "trust network," which is distinguished from other types of networks by their "ramified interpersonal connections, consisting of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, and failures of individual members" (Tilly, 2005, p. 12). Trust networks are based on religious, kinship, or ethnic ties. Two implications of this definition are that small-scale groups are more likely to form trust networks to secure their needs and livelihoods in the absence of a direct relationship with the state; and the group's boundaries are closely guarded against external intrusions.

West Bank Palestinians formed their trust networks based on kinship and village long before they migrated. Living under Jordanian rule, West Bank Palestinians had limited trust for this foreign authority and were predominantly left to their own volition in their villages (Farsoun and Zacharia, 1996; Khalidi, 2006). Matters were exacerbated by the imposition of Israeli military rule over the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 (Abu-Lughod, 1974; Peretz, 1986; Pappé, 2004). At this point, those West Bank Palestinians abroad lost their residency effectively becoming foreigners who needed special permits to return for visits. Those who remained behind were issued Israeli ID cards and required to apply for permits to dig wells, irrigate their land, and build homes (Escribano and el-Joubeh, 1981; Khalidi, 2006).

Both at home and abroad, Palestinians felt like exiles and turned inwards (Abu-Lughod, 1988; Said, 1986). The distrust in this Israeli was evident in the refusal to use the Israeli banking system and the avoidance of administrative transactions when possible (Mansour, 1982). Exile continued to be the premise of the first generation's identity upon arrival to the United States, in part due to past experiences with authority and partly because of the unsympathetic media attention noted earlier (Abraham, 1981, 1994; de Boer, 1983; Hagopian, 1976; Shaheen, 1984; Stockton, 1985; 1994; Suleiman, 1994;

1999; Trice, 1978). They maintained strong internal boundaries and supported group members in their new home to a build tight-knit family-based community. The latter relied on kinship to organize its most significant relations including marriage, business partnerships, and care of children and the elderly (Cainkar, 1988). In terms of politics, it was inactive and largely left to its own devices.

This had two relevant effects vis-à-vis September 11, namely that the second generation did not readily share its parents' sense of exile, and yet when contested the community tried to shield its members from external threat. Although the threat was different for citizens and non-citizens (formal), and native English speakers and non-English speakers (informal), the community's previous boundaries withstood these distinctions. This outcome, however, was not self-evident in the immediate aftermath of the terror attacks, but rather was contingent on numerous negotiations between the two generations.

Post-9/11

The remainder of this article is concerned with processes that brought the second generation to adopt their parents' sense of exile. The government began with *coercion* and the community responded with *concealment* before they both shifted their strategies. The government moved away from coercion towards other techniques of "integration," namely using its ability to control capital and requesting commitment (Tilly, 2005). The government utilized it three modes of control: coercion, capital, and commitment. In practice, these translated into policies, which included: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT), Operation Green Quest, Terrorism Interdiction Program (TIP), Terrorism Hotlines, Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), and National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) with the Department of Homeland Security for immigrants (Akram and Johnson, 2004; ALA, 2007; Boyd, 2001; CBP, 2002; CHRGJ, 2007; Hall, 2003; Howell, 2003; HRW, 2002; Moss, 2003; NYS-DHS, 2008; O'Harrow, 2008; U.S. Customs, 2002).

The mood of the nation could be gauged through Gallup Polls from September 14-15 2001, which showed that 60% wanted those of Arab descent to undergo more intensive security measures, 50% wanted them to carry special ID cards, and 32% felt they should be treated like Japanese-Americans (Saad, 2001). In 2005, the figures had decreased to 53% for the first question, remained the same for the second, and the third question was dropped from the survey (Saad, 2005). The internment question was replaced with a question about civil liberties, which a majority felt should be protected.

Activists and lawyers set into motion a series of public and academic debates in defense of civil liberties¹². Unlike previous eras, the voices in defense of Arab and

¹² Law professor, Leti Volpp, built an argument to demonstrate how racial profiling has been rampant despite assertions stating otherwise. She lists the number of ways that those who "look Middle Eastern" have been asked to prove their loyalty since 9/11, citing the 5000 "voluntary interviews" of Middle Easterners and Muslims and the detainment of over 12,000 individuals to prevent terrorist attacks

Muslims Americans were nearly as prominent as those of nativists (Morlino, 2004). Nonetheless, they were unable to shield these communities from all negative sanctions.

Absorbing the Shock

Prior to the FBI's arrival at doorsteps, the Palestinian-American community had already begun asking itself where it belonged. On the morning of September 11, 2001, I watched the plane hit the second tower on TV alongside a New Jersey Palestinian-American family in their kitchen. Everyone stood facing the TV speechless for what seemed to be a very long time before making calls to relatives and friends. At some point, Falesteen (college student) received a call from her cousin, Jamal, who was stranded at his university in New Jersey and could not find a way to return to his home in Brooklyn. I volunteered to drive with her to fetch him. It took several hours to pick him up and bring him back to Falasteen's home.

During the entire ride back, Jamal cried for the towers and frantically spoke about how he was finally going to take his professor's advice and have his name changed. Jamal was in his final year of law school and had been told repeatedly that his name reduced his marketability. He seemed to be convincing himself of the soundness of the decision. At one point, he turned to his cousin and I and warned us against using Kohl (Arabic eyeliner) since it would give away our origin¹³. Jamal appeared to be declaring his rejection of his Palestinian and Arab origin to become an un-hyphenated American. The reality of his response was less harsh for he did not sever ties with the community, but rather was trying to minimize the possibility of negative sanctions. His desire to be unidentifiable as an Arab/Palestinian and to change his name to "pass" as a member of another ethnicity corresponds to two strategies often employed by threatened groups, *concealment* and *dissimulation* respectively. Concealment and dissimulation are among six strategies utilized by groups who feel their sanctity is under threat.

Based on historical records, some unspecified segment of German-Americans relied on concealment and dissimulation at the start of World War I. Others, most notably the National German-American Alliance continued to lobby for American neutrality. Similarly, many in the Palestinian-American community did not share Jamal's response. Other strategies were implemented that aimed at ingratiating, negotiating, or detaching from the perceived threat to the group, namely government authorities. In keeping with

(2002). She also purported that to state that "hate crimes" were misplaced anger is to suggest they are understandable (Volpp, 2001). Critics of the government, who liken the differential treatment of US citizens caught in Afghanistan and Pakistan to that of citizens during World War II, also invoke a comparison to Japanese-Americans (Saito, 2005). During World War II, German and Italian-Americans were arrested but only Japanese-Americans were interned (Hatamiya, 1993; Spicer and Hansen, 1969). After 9/11, two US citizens were caught in Afghanistan and Pakistan, one of white ancestry and the other of Saudi ancestry. John Walked Lindt was tried in criminal courts in the US and sentenced to twenty years, while Yasser Esam Hamdi was labeled "illegal enemy combatant," taken to Guantanamo Bay before being held in Virginia. Eventually, he was released reportedly on the condition that he renounced his U.S. citizenship and would not sue the government in the future (Saito, 2005). Advocates believe that the US government is etching away at civil liberties hard won over the last half century under the guise of the "war of terror."

¹³ I will discuss Jamal's case subsequently. I remained in contact with him over the years and interviewed him formally in 2006.

Tilly's categorization, members of the community used *bargaining, clientage, dissolution, enlistment, and predation* (2005).

Although we often view coping strategies in individual-psychological terms, in the case of trust networks, each mechanism is negotiated internally. In other words, the kinship group mitigated the outcome of Jamal's decision by ignoring or ridiculing his name change. However, in the first hours, there was more shock than negotiation. Falesteen throughout the drive back was trying to contact her mother who was at work in Jersey and her aunt who worked in one of the WTC towers. This was a tense time since cell-phone reception was continuously interrupted and family members were on the road. It was evening when everyone's safety was verified. Hanan, Falesteen's aunt, was on her way to buy coffee when the first plane hit. She was on the second floor in the elevator and the doors automatically opened. Hanan began walking out of the building ignoring the security's calls for people to return to the building for safety. She informed us that she just kept walking amidst a crowd without thinking until she crossed the Brooklyn Bridge and eventually made her way home. Her husband was on call at the hospital where he worked and she stayed alone for the night. Unlike Jamal, Hanan did not vocalize any concerns about her origins. In fact, she never spoke of that day again. Almost her entire floor perished and her company relocated the survivors to London temporarily¹⁴.

As the family gathered together in the evening, Falasteen's father, a first generation immigrant, turned to me and asked if I had ever seen the towers. To his great dismay, I responded in the negative. I must have appeared un-affected, because he tearfully charged at me that it was impossible not to have paid attention to them. He went on to lament their loss for they represented New York and its skyline, and how difficult it would be for him to look at it again. He concluded that things would never be the same again and he was absolutely right, even if he had a different image in mind.

Community in the spotlight

In the coming days, story after story would emerge about the FBI requesting voluntary interviews. The government mobilized quickly to search potentially threatening communities without going through due process. As such, the interviews were voluntary, lacking subpoenas, and determined on national origin rather than any specific actions taken. Community members anticipated these visits having been screened after the 1993 WTC and McVeigh-Oklahoma terrorist attacks. Everyone complied on the premise that there was nothing to hide. If the German and Japanese cases provide any precedent, it is to suggest the list of men interviewed was established long before 9/11 and consisted of religious and community leaders or members of Arab-American organizations. With time, the measures became more organized as the "war on terror," and questioning became open-ended.

Public Backlash

There were stories of veiled first-generation women refusing to leave their homes, parents of children in the Islamic schools keeping their kids at home, and Arab businesses

¹⁴ She has been asked numerous times to appear on Arabic TV channels to speak about her experience, but she insisted that she has nothing to say about it.

temporarily closing down or losing a lot of their clientele¹⁵. I was visiting one family when their pre-teen son, Tamer, was sent home from school for getting into an argument with another student. He was extremely upset and asked his mother if it were really Palestinians who were responsible for the attack, since his teacher had said that it was those “f***ing Palestinians again.” This triggered ridicule from one of his friends, who kept calling him a terrorist and asking him what he was going to blow up next, throughout the day. He eventually responded, “I am going to bomb your house if you don’t leave me alone.”

Tamer’s parents were upset and lectured him on his response. His mother told him that he was, “An American first and foremost.” She also told him if he didn’t like it, he could give up his citizenship to someone who would gratefully take it off his hands. His father took a different approach telling him to never use any words insinuating violence, even in jest, since such words would always be misinterpreted. When Tamer objected accusing his friend of starting it, his father responded, “but coming from you it is different.” Tamer’s mother followed up the next day with the principal, who defended the teacher’s evocation as exceptional. His mother informed the school that he had been instructed to leave class in the future. Both boys were suspended. This was the first of many negotiations between the first and second generations. Tamer’s parents presented a conflicting message that reinforced public opinion by emphasizing “different” in the process of telling him he is American first.

In another incident, recounted by a high school senior, FBI agents came to his school and pulled him out of class. The young man had taken three flying lessons towards a pilot’s license. The agents asked him why he had taken the flying lessons to which he retorted, “Because I want to learn how to fly.” They suggested he find another hobby and left him behind wondering how they could question an American in this way¹⁶. His bravado was explained by his age and his family advised him to discontinue his flying lessons, which falls within the realm of concealment- not coming to the attention of the authorities.

In the midst of the chaos, there was one detail that the community took comfort in, namely that there were no Palestinians among the terrorists. This is a consolation they still speak about, although effectively they may have been the only ones to take notice of it. Near one of the streets where the community members lived, I saw a car with graffiti sprawled across the back windshield saying, “bomb the Palestinians.” Other agitations included “Be patriotic, kill an Arab” written in marker across the back of a truck and a series of tire slashings on the two blocks where several of the families I knew resided¹⁷.

¹⁵ Similar stories were reported in local and national news across the country. See: BNET, 2001; Cankar, 2002; 2008; CHRGI, 2007; Hall, 2003; Howell, 2003; HRW, 2002; Moss, 2003, Paulson, 2003; Slevin, 2004.

¹⁶ Five years after the incident occurred and the young man had not returned to flying. As of the writing of this article, he worked at a car dealership and there are conflicting views about whether he completed his license. Apparently, he worked for an airline briefly, but it was unclear if he quit or he was fired. He refuses to discuss the issue.

¹⁷ The neighborhood is a Palestinian- Latino mix, but only Palestinian owned cars were slashed. I was initially hesitant to include these two examples until I realized their importance recently. As I was writing this article, I decided to ask several young individuals about what they remembered from the period after 9/11 only to discover these were the incidents they remembered most vividly. The cars with the writing the attacked Palestinians and Arabs did not belong to Arabs.

The community was and has remained skeptical about the origins of the terrorists. They refuse to believe that Arabs were capable of such precision, planning, or technical skills. In part, like many other Arabs, they genuinely do not believe Arabs have the necessary discipline¹⁸. A more plausible explanation lies in their desire to distance themselves from the terrorists, a desire that manifested itself through public displays of patriotism in the weeks following 9/11¹⁹. American flags went up in the front windows of people's homes and declarations of solidarity and sympathy were printed and taped on car rear windows. This offset additional discord between the two generations for it was members of the first generation who were exhibiting this patriotism.

Post-Civil Rights Generation Reacts

Many of those in the second generation I came across vehemently disagreed with their parents' actions and in some cases insisted that the flags be taken down. In addition, there was one sign that had been distributed in the community that read "Our hearts goes out to the victims' families," which the second generation found amusing since as they told their parents that was a sure way to identify oneself as Arab²⁰. Randall Collins in writing about displays of solidarity after 9/11 purported that minorities of Middle Eastern and Muslim backgrounds were most likely to display signs of solidarity on taxis and in their store windows (2004). He described these measures as a "protective use of symbols" (2004, p. 60). While Collins did not make clear why these displays were protective for these groups and more emotional for everyone else. His analysis would have perhaps benefited from recognizing that motivations may have been varied and that there were internal differences in the usage of these symbols. Collins tells part of the story, since the first generation was being protective of the community and the second generation took them to task specifically because of this reason. The latter felt their parents were somehow being "apologetic" for the events and that as Americans they did not need to display their grief/anger in such a public manner. While the parents may have been instrumental at some level, it was also an attempt at *enlistment* or actively integrating into the surrounding regime. Simply put, they were grieving and wanted to share in the national collective grief.

The disagreements between the first and second generations intensified as parents tried to curb their children's movement and visibility. In several instances, young women were asked, "if this was the right time to be wearing a headscarf?" They were encouraged to stop wearing them for their personal safety. The responses from these young women were a unanimous refusal to remove the headscarves. In fact, some chose to wear the headscarf in response to the 9/11-backlash.

Young men all throughout the community were beseeched to keep a low profile: not to travel around alone, to return home early, and to avoid demonstrations. While young men felt this was an affront to their independence, they tended to comply convinced they were more likely to be profiled, arrested, and/or taken in for questioning. As such, the first large peace rally at Times Square in October 2001 sparsely saw young

¹⁸ One could speculate about the causes of this self-devaluation, from colonialism to self-awareness, however this is beyond the scope of this study.

¹⁹ I propose this explanation is more plausible for pragmatic reasons and because only recently Hezbollah was extolled by many Arabs for its discipline and precision.

²⁰ They believed this grammatical error was typical of Arabs.

men from the community. Instead, I went with two sisters, Falesteen and Zeitouni, from New Jersey and there we met up with additional young women from Brooklyn²¹.

Falasteen wrapped a Palestinian scarf around her shoulders and brought out her Palestinian flag. Zeitouni did neither. As we drove through the tunnel, listening to Palestinian national songs, Zeitouni asked Falesteen to park as close to the demonstrators as possible, because “she didn’t want to be beaten up or spat on.” We parked two blocks from the demonstration, and Zeitouni distanced herself from us, walking faster than I had ever seen her walk before.

Once we were in the midst of the crowd, Falasteen decided that she wanted to wear her Palestinian scarf as a veil. She told me to watch how people were going to try to pick fights with her, but only one person walked by and gestured “forget you” with his hand. It was difficult to assess how much the police’s presence mitigated reactions since there were almost as many police officers as there were demonstrators. The police officers were carrying video cameras filming the demonstrators as we walked around Times Square. Eventually, Zeitouni appeared less tense than she had originally been and asked to wear the scarf and carry the flag. Thus Falesteen and Zeitouni tested their space in different ways, but eventually agreed on the more overt display of their Palestinian origin. I attended several other demonstrations, but they seldom had more than a couple of dozen participants. It was only in the summer of 2006 that another large peace march took place across the Brooklyn Bridge²².

In the evening on the day of the October rally I attended a Middle Eastern Club party at a college in New Jersey. It was a Palestinian fashion show and the hall was virtually empty. I sat at a table with six second-generation Palestinian women. One in particular appeared irritated by the presence of the two security guards sitting in the corner of the room. She assumed an authoritative voice and said, “they heard the A- raabs were having a party and thought they are terrorists, God knows what they are really going to do, we better get some security over there to watch them.” In the course of two hours, she repeated this comment in several different ways, but always stressed that we were “terrorists” who couldn’t be trusted to have a party without supervision. I looked over at the security guards and they appeared to be relaxed, they were enjoying the food and watching the young women dance to Arabic music. Nonetheless, it prompted the young woman to express other general concerns she had. She voiced these in English laced with an Arabic accent (although she spoke English flawlessly) pretending to be her father asking for directions, or the cost of an item in a store and immediately being called a terrorist or Bin Laden’s cousin.

On another night in late September 2001, I attended a 9/11 vigil held at Weehawken in New Jersey with the same set of young women. They decided to switch to Arabic as soon as we walked away from the car. There were lots of people there, but as one of the young women noted there were no other Arabs²³. She believed they were

²¹ This was at the beginning of my research when I knew the New Jersey community more so than the Brooklyn community. Thus although I was introduced to faces I would come to know later from Brooklyn, I did not interact with them much at the time.

²² I was away for this rally, but I was sent photographs from that day. However, I attended the May 16 2008 rally commemorating the 60th year of al-Nakba (“catastrophe”). Al-Nakba took place in 1948 when Palestinians were exiled and the State of Israel was established. The large number of Palestinian-American men of all ages present at this rally suggests that much of their reservations from 2001 had dissipated.

²³ To them other Arabs usually means people they recognize from their own Palestinian community.

probably too scared to come out in public. Clearly, there are indications of what Ruben Rumbaut labeled “role reversal” (2001). Nancy Foner and Philip Kassinitz identified a similar phenomenon that empowered the children over their parents and caused intergenerational conflict (2007). These scholars intended the usage to describe how the second generation at times assumes authoritative roles over parents who lack the language proficiency needed to navigate the system, yet it seems befitting in this case as well. Although the second generation was not embarrassed by the first generation, they did perceive them as less capable of fending for themselves and in need of protection.

I joined a different set of women for dinner by their university campus in New Jersey during the same period²⁴. There were 11 women present, three of whom wore a headscarf. As soon as we entered the restaurant, I noticed that one man in his thirties having dinner with his family stopped eating and stared at the veiled young women standing beside me. I looked over several times to make sure that I had not misinterpreted a casual glance, but each time I found him still staring. Our table wasn’t ready, so we sat in the waiting area. An older woman waiting for her order glared at the young women. When her order was finally ready, she pushed them out of her way whilst giving a little grunt. I assume I looked taken aback, because one of those wearing a veil turned to me and said with a sigh, “people always treat us like that.” Another added, “they stare like ohhh it’s one of *them!*”

At times, they do more than simply stare as one person found out on her way to the mosque one afternoon. She had put on a headscarf before leaving her home to avoid having to put it on in the mosque bathroom²⁵. She came upon a red light and slammed on the brakes, which caused the car behind her to also come to an abrupt halt. The driver of the car decided to get out of his car and walk over to her car and start yelling referring to her as a “Taliban whore.” She felt physically threatened, but all she could do was lock her door and wait for the light to turn green again.

There were numerous instances like these, some real and some assumed. At times they seemed to be pleased to “see how people would react,” but at others they were self-conscious and uneasy. Whether anxious or proud, the second generation made it a point of listening to their Arabic music at full volume in their cars and speaking Arabic in public²⁶. The importance of relaying these stories lays in the cumulative effect they had on the second generation. The seeds were sown that made the American-born more receptive to the idea of being exiled. Yet, they fought for their rights of self-expression as minorities. The duality of exile and American minority has become endemic in their self-understanding in the years since 9/11.

Government measures contribute to “othering”

Arab and Muslim became the community’s master statuses during this period, which lasted about two months. They were preoccupied with how they were perceived and how they would be treated in public. All talk of weddings, which factored largely

²⁴ These events took place at the inception of my field research when my access to young men was limited. I met them at family gatherings, but didn’t spend time with them in public. This changed with time.

²⁵ Head covering is required for entering a mosque even when the woman is not veiled on a regular basis.

²⁶ In more private setting, they listened to hip-hop music more than Arabic and spoke to one another in English. Over the years, as they left their teens they also left much of the hip-hop behind choosing to listen to Arabic music.

into most conversations prior to 9/11, was silenced. Although a wedding recaptured the community's imagination by the end of 2001, complete shedding of the externally proscribed label proved to be impossible. Like other Arab and/or Muslim communities, they were affected by the 1,200 arrests in 2001; the 2003 NSEERS, also known as "Special Registration" program, that led to the incarceration of 13, 434 in deportation facilities; and the presence of FBI agents and police officers in Arab neighborhoods especially around mosques²⁷. Notwithstanding their citizenship and place of birth, community members have been randomly chosen for additional screening at airports and some presumably are on the "watch lists" used by airlines.

Thus the pressures exerted by government indicated to the community it was a suspect population that was either to be controlled or integrated, in spite of its self-definition that may already include "integrated." Perhaps by categorizing them as Arab and Muslim, they were removed from former identifications and required to re-integrate under their new "identity." Some Palestinian-Americans thought the categorization beneficial if only because they were no longer the only ones targeted. In response to the question about the differences between Palestinians and other Arabs, Amal proclaimed, "nothing, now we are all the same, all [Muslims and Arabs] are treated like terrorists."²⁸

"Being treated like terrorists" translated into feelings of being closely monitored in every aspect of their daily lives, from their phone calls, travels, donations, money transfers, to their bookkeeping. One might reasonably ask if they were perhaps exaggerating the sense of discrimination or threat to their privacy, except that in the last seven years most families have had an encounter with the authorities, know of someone who has, or have been subjected to some sort ethnic slur at work or school. In the initial post-9/11 backlash, the TIPS program enabled "concerned citizens" to call in suspicious behavior. One such person called in claiming the FBI she had seen a "Middle Eastern" man driving a van towards the Holland Tunnel²⁹. In response, two Port Authority officers arrived at this man's in-laws' home where his sister-in-law answered the door. The latter, Sireen, was home cooking for guests from college. As she described it to me later that evening, she opened the door to the officers who asked her about a white van registered in her sister's name. She informed them that the driver was her brother-in-law and he used the van to pick up supplies for his dollar store from New York. The officers apologized and told her they were obligated to respond to all calls. Thinking the incident was resolved she returned to her preparations only to have a FBI agent show up moments before her friends arrived.

The agent asked to enter their home and proceeded to ask another set of questions about the van. At one point, she told him that the officers had come earlier in the day. He informed her that the officers had failed to complete the required report and he would do that once she answered a few questions. Prior to leaving he apologized empathetically as a Latino, who was often stereotyped a welfare-scammer. Sireen responded that it was not the same, since people thought they were terrorists out to kill people not to scam welfare. She recalled feeling embarrassed as she tried to explain the incident to her friends who had seen the black car drive away. She also wondered if her neighbors were going to

²⁷ In fact, the number of mosques in a neighborhood initially assessed the terror threat until this practice was deemed discriminatory (Cainkar, 2004).

²⁸ Amal was referring to arrests of Palestinian activists in the past.

²⁹ The Holland Tunnel is one of the main passageways connecting New York and New Jersey.

think they were criminals. The agent's analogy was appropriate despite Sireen's rejection of it. Latino immigrants, particularly Mexicans and Haitians, carry collective stigma of being illegal and/or on welfare (Cardova, 2005; Menjivar, 2007; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Rumbaut and Portes, 2001; Stepick, 1992). While being called a terrorist is worse than being deemed illegal, research is required to determine the effect on life chances of either group.

Capital Surveillance

Not all FBI inquiries were resolved so quickly, especially when they involved money matters. Major Arab and Muslim organizations and banks were first to come under government investigation. These were the moments when the government focused its efforts on its power to control *capital*. While this was a shift away from direct reliance on *coercion*, the control of capital was bolstered by the threat of more punitive measures as will be seen below.

The two most visible cases stirred since 9/11 involved Palestinian-American institutions. The first target was the Holy Land Foundation, a Palestinian charity that was accused of funding terrorism in the West Bank³⁰. Shortly thereafter, the Arab Bank came under legal attack from groups that claimed the bank was being used to transfer money to Palestinian suicide bombers in the West Bank. By February 2005, the Treasury Department ordered the Arab Bank to abstain from opening new accounts and to cease all business transfers³¹. The Arab Bank is Palestinian-American owned and according to the individuals in the community was the preferred bank of many people who transferred money to their families in the West Bank³².

These two measures sent a chilling effect throughout the communities in New York and New Jersey, since many donated to the Holy Land Foundation or used the Arab Bank. There were several different reactions; many people became wary of donating or if they were to donate they either chose charities that were on the government's "ok list" like Save the Children or World Vision (i.e. non-Arab) or they donated in cash. At a fundraiser for West Bank college education, most people chose to pay for their tickets and additional donations in cash. A small number of people offered checks and most were members of the association's board³³. Still others opted to rely on direct transfers

³⁰ The Holy Land Foundation was designated a financial supporter of Hamas in December 2001 by an Executive Order. The FBI and Treasury Department froze the foundation's assets. In October 2007, a judge declared a mistrial on this case and the 5 defendants were acquitted of most of the charges against them. Another trial scheduled for September 15 focusing on two defendants charged with: conspiracy, supporting a foreign terrorist organization, money laundry, and filing false taxes (Johnson and Pincus, 2008; Trahan and Gabrielle, 2007).

³¹ The bank was also ordered to maintain assets of \$420 million in its New York branch (Preston, 2005). The bank was initially accused of being used to fund suicide bombers in the West Bank, but was eventually fined by the U.S. Department of Treasury a sum of \$24 million on civil charges in 2005. See http://www.fincen.gov/new_room/ea/files/arab081705.pdf

³² Between 1967-1994, Arab Bank was the sole non-Israeli bank to continue operations in the West Bank. Palestinians' refusal to use Israeli banks elevated Arab Bank to the only bank they utilized since the occupation.

³³ It is plausible that many immigrants prefer to deal in cash, however in weddings and internal family exchanges, checks are commonly used.

through friends and family to the West Bank rather than donate³⁴. The latter was a method most were accustomed to using and did not require any changes or added skills.

Next businesses were investigated for any irregularities in taxes and illegitimate hires. Scholars and activists have described these as sweeps over Muslim and Arab businesses where their finances were scrutinized with a fine-toothed comb (Hagopian, 2004). From the sheer number of stories about businesses “visited” or investigated, these observers are accurate in their depiction of Operation Green Quest, the program devised to detect any money laundering to terrorist organizations, as a sweep. However, the community does not share the alarm scholars and activists express indiscriminately.

In many instances, people were held accountable for their own downfall since they chose to engage in illegitimate business practices. Yet, the line between legal and illegal is fine for the community. For instance, a person who hires newcomers off the books is considered a good person who does not deserve the legal troubles. There were two such large businesses in Brooklyn and New Jersey that were under investigation and people lamented their incrimination since this would harm current and future employees. In both cases, the employer had hired newcomers, before their status was secure, for over twenty years unimpeded. On the other hand, the person who avoided paying taxes or was involved in coupon or food stamp scams for personal profit was not accorded any sympathy.

The objectives and interests of this trust network can be traced through the reasoning used to condemn or condone certain actions that are illegal. Most acts that help maintain group cohesion and financial sustenance are treated with greater leniency³⁵. Thus when the government clamped down on these acts, the threat was perceived as real and community members assisted in concealing these business practices when they could.

Finally, investigations trickled down to the individual level whereby people making too many bank transfers to the West Bank were also “visited.” In one case, a young woman caught the attention of the authorities because she was sending money to the West Bank in her name. Presumably this was “suspicious” because of her gender, age, and frequency of transfers. In reality, this young woman was the family breadwinner responsible for her relatives and the building of the family home in the West Bank. This and similar cases resonated with the community for it appeared the government was trying to discourage mutual support and aid in the larger network. The fabric that tied people together was threatened, and those investigated were offered full support from the community.

In another case, Alaa was implicated in a crime he had not committed. It was quickly explained to him by his lawyer that he was brought in as the “leaner,” essentially a person who was tangentially connected to those who had committed a crime. Supposedly, he was expected to inform on others. The crime in this case was a financial scam. He was charged with theft by deception and several other accounts, while the other six men involved in the actual scheme were charged with financing terrorism.

The men were all arrested through simultaneous raids on their homes at 6 am on a Monday morning. Six FBI agents showed up at each house. The agents entered all the

³⁴ One could conceivably conclude that this has increased the divide between those living in the West Bank who have relatives in the US and those who don't. However, this is beyond the scope of this present article.

³⁵ The acts I am referring to, whether condemned or condoned, usually involve petty theft, monetary scams, and hiring people off the books rather than more serious crimes like murder.

bedrooms looking for the suspects. Alaa was away for job training at the time, but the agents did not accept his mother's word for it and insisted on searching their house. The agents mistook Alaa's teenaged brother for him and were pulling him out of bed when the mother stepped in protesting that they had the wrong son and her children were frightened. Alaa gave himself in to the authorities upon his return. He was dismissed from his new job as soon as his arrest appeared in a background check.

Despite the deals he was offered, he insisted on his innocence and was eventually sentenced to probation. The funding terrorism charge against the other men was dropped and they were fined for the financial scheme. The community's reactions were mixed since people lacked sympathy for the crime, yet felt the association with terrorist activity was another instance of exaggerated government response. It is clear that the community had its own set of moral standards that did not coincide with that of activists or the government. Incentives for personal preservation and abandonment of the community were formidable, yet all efforts were made to reinterpret these as threats from external sources that did not have the members' best interest in mind.

Some *dissolution* or breaking up of the network did occur despite all efforts. A real estate agent informed me that she had sold homes of Palestinian-Americans after their owners had left the country. She did not know the exact circumstances of their departure, except for that they fled with their families entrusting friends with sale of the property. Several explanations can be gleaned from the literature including that these individuals were in violation of their visas or were involved in illegal ventures and feared getting caught. It cannot be that they were already implicated in a crime for they would not have been able to board any plane under those circumstances.

Visa violations became a serious issue after the government announced its "Special Registration" (NSEERS) program on September 11, 2002 (Hagopian, 2004). By design, the program was intended to be a comprehensive enumeration of all nonimmigrant, undocumented, and out of status individuals without the threat of punishment. Arab and Muslim adult males were called upon to register first, but before the program was expanded to other groups, it was phased out (Murray, 2004). Nationals of twenty-five countries were required to register; all of the countries were Arab or Muslim with the exception of North Korea (Hutchinson and Garcia, 2003). In an American Civil Liberties Union letter an objection was raised over Palestinians having to register with NSEERS considering the West Bank and Gaza were not among the twenty-five countries listed (Hutchinson and Garcia, 2003).

Through these measures, the government underscored the differences between citizens and non-citizens in the community. In turn, the first generation, like Tamer's mother mentioned earlier, emphasized the privilege of citizenship. At each turn, the first generation was grateful for the citizenship that guaranteed them due legal process in times of adversity. Conversely, the second generation focused on the lack of rights of non-citizens. Such instances demonstrate another disagreement between the two generations whereby the first generation argues its good fortune in having American citizenship and the second generation takes this for granted and thus is quicker to stress government excesses. Interestingly, the difference in categorization does not lead to a rift between the two generations over membership. A similar situation was noted after the passing of Proposition 187 in California calling for more restrictive laws against undocumented immigrants. The latter prompted protests from second generation

Mexican- Americans in what has been described as “reactive ethnicity” (Rumbaut and Portes, 2001; Waters, 1996). Little can be said about Japanese and German-Americans since the records lack these details.

Appeals to Commitment

At times, the FBI “visited” businesses not to investigate them, but rather to ask for assistance in locating certain individuals or information on suspicious activities. Likewise, community associations, lawyers, and social workers were approached to join cooperative endeavors to “fight terrorism.” The authorities shifted from their initial coercive approach to relying on commitment to the nation. The responses were mixed, as were the motivations for cooperation. Their ability to obtain the assistance of several associations is not necessarily a sign of acceptance in all instances. Perhaps large-scale organizations such as the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and the Arab American Institute (AAI) welcomed such collaborations because they viewed themselves as the intermediaries between the communities and the government, and they have a keen interest in increasing the participation of Arab-Americans in the American societal fabric.

Such organizations are political entrepreneurs that want to speak on behalf of the Arab communities in general and are implementing the strategies of *enlistment* and *bargaining*. Enlistment is the process of trying to fit into an existing niche, which the AAI and ADC do as advocacy groups for the loosely connected Arab-American population. They are in agreement with the U.S. government over the label Arab, but not Muslim, and are trying to achieve minority status recognition for Arab-Americans³⁶. ADC added the statement “American first” to its motto soon after the terrorist attacks. Secondly, by inviting major political figures like Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice to speak at their annual functions, ADC and AAI are bargaining or expressing a desire for exchange and recognition.

Their local community counterparts view such collaborations as impositions. Nonetheless, cooperation has not been outright rejected. To the contrary, several associations have taken the initiative to invite FBI agents and local authorities to their events. This introduces a fifth strategy of dealing with government, namely *clientage*. Relations are strengthened with those in an intermediate level of authority in order to ward off additional surveillance.

In 2005, one of the associations I am familiar with extended invitations to the two FBI agents assigned to their area to its annual dinner. The agents attended and were easily identifiable in the crowd. One of the association’s representatives explained to me that she believed in “keeping her friends close and her enemies closer.” The agents were invited again in 2006 when I was working at the door. There was much anticipation over their attendance, but no one showed. The speaker expressed a suspicion of authorities that the first generation had long held under foreign rule, but seemed to be seeping into the sentiments of the second generation.

³⁶ Arabs are counted as “white” on the census. AAI, in particular, has been lobbying for a number of years to attain a separate category to include Arabs unsuccessfully. There has been internal resistance among the Arab population to a Middle Eastern label, and external resistance to an Arab only label.

Perceptions of constant surveillance

Perceptions not preclude covert attendance at conventions, conferences, and other venues. ADC publications corroborate the community members' belief that any of their conferences, conventions, or other venues could be under surveillance (ADC, 2003b). This wariness was evident at a convention held in Washington DC for the creation of a new Arab-American association (National Council of Arab-Americans-NCA) to deal with the needs of Arab communities across the country. In their mission statement, they identified themselves as being unlike ADC and AAI in that they were both Arab and American instead of American first³⁷. They also identified as a grassroots movement, which was not interested in being "invited the White House either for those on the Left or the Right." This association was making an attempt at *predation* to present themselves as inclusive of the entire community by stating that they were an umbrella organization that welcomed all existing Arab associations. They also stressed the importance of building alliances with other human rights and minority groups as would be expected of a predatory organization that wants to develop enough strength to defend its constituency. Thus far, the organization has not adopted any other group and remains to work through awareness building via the Internet.

At the start of the NCA's 3-day founding convention, there were whispers of potential surveillance³⁸. These become anxious vocalizations once the news arrived that the Chicago contingent was not attending because of a raid on its office by the FBI the previous night. Their computers were confiscated and 5 members were arrested. Concern and discomfort were visible on the faces of some of the participants as they wondered if the convention was under investigation as well. The convention completed its agenda without interruption. Most of those in attendance were first generation professionals and their approach was cautious. Some refused to announce their names when they stood to speak, others didn't want to add their names to the listserv. The issues that were raised at this meeting were Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the targeting of Palestinian professors on American campuses, children's history books with regards to Palestine, and the Iraq war. However, the discussions remained calm and words were shrewdly chosen.

Incidentally, the Chicago episode was not mentioned again. When I asked about it a few weeks later, I was told the FBI was suspicious of Islamic fundamentalist activity and eventually released all those arrested. I had met the contingency from that particular office a month before the convention while I was visiting Chicago, and the one thing I noted, ironically, was that they were critical of building of new mosques in the area. Over dinner, they complained that too much money was being spent by Arab-Americans on mosques that could be used for better community mobilization in the US, and more assistance to the West Bank.

Palestinians were at the helm of NCA, similar to the many Arab-American organization when they were first established³⁹. Nonetheless there were associations and

³⁷ Following 9/11, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee changed its name to American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.

³⁸ I had been invited to attend by a first generation man and woman who were part of the project in its inception stage. There I made several additional key contacts from the Brooklyn community.

³⁹ This point was alluded to previously earlier. Lebanese and Palestinian-Americans established most Arab-American associations.

groups that were explicitly Palestinian in their mission statement and name. These organizations raised funds and awareness about the situation in the West Bank and thus did not experience any major shifts in protocol. They were small in number and size prior to 9/11 and have continued to be so. Overall, the limited events these organizations held were assumed to be under heavy surveillance. Despite this belief, the songs requested by young members of the audience at one fundraiser were politically charged⁴⁰. In fact, the first song performed by a Palestinian singer brought in for the occasion was “We are not terrorists.” Later during a speech on Jerusalem and the suffering of Palestinians in the West Bank, a group of young men broke out chanting, “With our souls, with our lives, we will defend you Palestine.” All the while they were waving a Palestinian flag and scarves above their heads. This stood in contrast with the mood at the NCA convention. Admittedly, the NCA was an interest group gathering and the fundraiser was open to the community-at-large, yet the first and generation had different ways of expressing their discord in venues that were presumably being monitored. The intricacies of these negotiations become apparent when one considers that the more demonstrative and vocal were all members of the second generation. Even when surveillance was presumed, they did not censor themselves, reinforcing the idea of membership entitlement that the first generation lacked.

More humorous relaying of surveillance includes stories of how first generation Palestinian-Americans try to censor their relatives over the phone. One young woman laughingly recounted a phone conversation between her father and her aunt in the West Bank where he kept pretending he could not understand what was being said. Her aunt was complaining about the Israeli checkpoints and cursing the war on Iraq, at first her father asked her to be quiet. The response from the aunt was, “what else could they do to us? They want to come take my house too let them come.” Not knowing how to quiet his sister down, the man started speaking over her saying, “ohh so you are saying you made moulukhiya [stew] today? Did you make it with meat or chicken? Chicken...oh that’s my favorite.”⁴¹

It was commonplace to hear young people laughing over the phone commenting on how their conversation amused/bored/caught the attention of the eavesdropper. People insisted that they heard clicking noises on their phones, especially when Palestine or Israel came up. The clicking was interpreted as someone either tuning in or out of their conversation. Whether any sort of clicking actually indicates eavesdropping is irrelevant since those who spoke of the clicking were convinced it was occurring and acted accordingly⁴².

Calls for commitment

The community attracted potentially positive attention as young people were recruited to join the armed forces, government intelligence, and to work as translators.

⁴⁰ I knew the requests came from the younger audience members from one of the organizers. In addition, there was a split between the choice of songs between the two generations where the first generation was pleased with the classical Arabic selection and the second were disappointed. The latter wanted Palestinian songs they were familiar with.

⁴¹ According to the storyteller’s account.

⁴² One would assume that phone tapping has progressed to the point where the targeted person is unaware of the intrusion. Or perhaps the idea is to intimidate.

These incentives and offerings were a mixture of the government's use of means of control through *capital* and *commitment*. Unlike the previous punitive approach towards control of capital, the measures were meant to entice people to cooperate with the government. Obviously, the government was not only interested in controlling Arabs and Muslims, but in fact needed their services and skills, especially language skills. A call for *commitment* was intertwined with the financial incentives. The young men were being recruited as American citizens with skills their government needed. This method is certainly neither unique to this case nor to the US government. It was used with German and Japanese-Americans precisely at the time that they were collectively deemed the enemy within. The difference, recalling the historical analysis, was that Japanese-Americans served in segregated units, whereas German and Arab/Muslim-Americans served in regular units.

The first generation stood vehemently against these overtures and attempts, while some individuals in the second generation contemplated the possibilities and security promised. Some men did enlist in the army, but as with other actions the moral compass of the community was internally determined. The general consensus seemed to be that if the young men were in financial need or wanted to secure their education then they could not be blamed for joining. However, as in the case of one young man, if the family was well off then the individual was highly criticized. This young man worked in Iraq but breached his contract and returned to the US before he had fulfilled his mission. He would not disclose the exact reasons he left Iraq to me, but he did offer two partial explanations; the first was that he had seen things he could not speak of, and the second was that the government required that he repatriate his West Bank Palestinian ID. In his view, this request was unacceptable to him irrespective of not needing or using that ID.

Mothers intervened when recruiters called for their young sons and requested their names be removed from school rosters used. Several men I had spoken to considered working for the US army as translators in Iraq. They reasoned that they would not engage in combat and within a year they would secure their financial futures. The sums they mentioned varied from 80,000-150,000 per year with housing and food covered while in Iraq⁴³. They also stressed the importance of obtaining a security clearance, which they explained would allow them to go through any airport in the world without being stopped⁴⁴. Yet, none of them followed through.

Only one adolescent openly stated that if one is going to carry the passport then he must also serve the country. In most cases mothers and sisters intervened to stop the young men from enlisting. Several young men also indicated that they were approached with lucrative salaries to work for government intelligence, which they had all reportedly turned down⁴⁵. Two main reasons were given: they were not prepared to spy on their own community and they did not want to keep secrets from their families. One of these young men nevertheless went on to be a New York police officer arguing that he wanted to

⁴³ Although I have no way of verifying these figures, there was a New York Times article in 2006 corroborating such high compensation. See Elliot, A. October 7, 2006. "For Recruiter Speaking Arabic, Saying 'Go Army' Is a Hard Job," *New York Times*.

⁴⁴ This point is particularly significant considering that these young men had spent their lives being stopped at Israeli borders and now were being inspected at American borders as well.

⁴⁵ Due to the sensitivity of this issue, it is not surprising that only those who turned down the offers spoke about being approached. One could only speculate that others accepted the offers, although it would mean having to keep the position secret from their immediate family members as well.

serve his community and city by working hard like everyone else. The young were tempted, but their final actions were dependent on internal community negotiations.

Second-generation mobilization for the community

As stated previously, most of the first generation, except former activists, wanted to reclaim the pre-9/11 invisibility and calm⁴⁶. The second generation had several reactions, some tried to pass, some become involved directly in community politics, while others chose to focus on their careers. Jamal was one of those who tried to pass by changing his name after 9/11. Proof of the attempt at *dissimulation* became evident in the choice of name. Jamal deferred that task to his female classmates since he felt it did not impact his identity. The constant ridicule received from the community compelled him to use his new name for professional purposes only. A law firm hired him after graduation where he worked until the partners discovered that he had changed his name. He had neglected to change his name on his social security card. He has since found another position with a smaller law firm. Perhaps this was an isolated incident of discrimination, but to Jamal it pressed the message that his origin was undesirable. Another interpretation could be more individual in terms of a lack of confidence.

Conversely, others became involved in community politics working for local associations as social workers and lawyers. These individuals explained that they were drawn to these positions because they had skills and privileges that could be put to use by the community. However, they were often overwhelmed since they were volunteers and needed other jobs for income. Individual narratives of how they reached their positions indicate their place in the American mainstream. One young woman explained that she had a Brooklyn accent, looked Greek, and knew when to she needed to become “ghetto.” She felt these were qualities that many of her “masacheen” [helpless] clients lacked. In fact, she decided to wear the headscarf to distinguish herself from other groups and signal that she was Muslim and Arab and still competent. She aspires to run for local office in Brooklyn. Another woman decided to offer her services as a lawyer to the community because she was trusted as an insider and she wanted to protect her community. She knew there were obstacles ahead of her since she was often treated as “guilty by association,” but this seemed to fuel her work rather than discourage it. Nonetheless, the number of people working in this manner remains low.

The majority of young people seemed to be of the opinion that excelling in their chosen careers was the way to assist the community. Law is one of the most attractive careers to the second generation. In part, they are taken by the prestige and the monetary rewards. However, these were not the aspects of the profession they stressed. Instead, young men and women talked about law being the cornerstone of American society. One young man referred to law as the key to the US, which apparently the community has not gotten hold of yet. Another young woman, who had contemplated applying to law school, reasoned that she wanted to wear a headscarf and enter a courtroom. She for some time would ask rhetorically, “can you imagine me a Palestinian with a headscarf in a courtroom how cool would that be?” Considering that the younger generation is opting to

⁴⁶ The founders of NCA had all been previously or currently involved in other Palestinian and non-Palestinian social movements. A sizable number were engaged in the founding of the now-defunct Arab-American Association of University Graduates that emerged in the aftermath of the 1967 war.

wear the headscarf, one wonders if this is not in part a reaction to the 9/11-backlash and their desire to appropriate the identity of difference? In at least this one case, the woman put on the headscarf for several days and then removed it. Her relatives had discouraged her from wearing it and she did not want the added restrictions on her actions.

Two other young men described their aspirations in terms of putting Palestinians on the map. In other words, they wanted to represent Palestinians in the US. One had just completed his police training and was envisioning the day when it would be announced that there was a Palestinian police commissioner. The other was undecided about a career in law or a government job, but he was certain that he wanted to represent Palestinians at the top of American society. Evidently, young individuals were trying to *enlist* in the available niches in the US professional sectors without disrupting or abandoning their community. On the contrary, they wanted to enter professions that were underrepresented and needed in their community. The obstacles and impediments they faced in the process of *enlistment* (filling niches within society) evoked in the young sympathy towards the first generation's skepticism about their inclusion in American society.

Merging of exile and minority identification

Second generation Palestinian-Americans began to identify more with their parents, whether it was because they worried about their parents' safety or because they had experienced some of the backlash more directly. The different reactions can be attributed to the two generations' relation to their citizenship. As naturalized citizens, most of those in the first generation articulated their status in terms of privilege. On the other hand, as American-born Palestinians, the second generation took their status for granted making them sensitive to any perceived infringement on their rights as Americans. Well-versed in the ideals of American nationhood and citizen rights, the second generation used its discourse of inclusion to respond to the nativist voices and legislations of exclusion.

Two questions arise from these assertions: where have the demonstrations gone? And how are people voting? If indeed the second generation feels a sense of entitlement, then why have they practically removed themselves from the public sphere of peace marches and demonstrations? Were we to rely on outcomes alone as in the German and Japanese-American cases, the answer would be that the second generation sped up its assimilation into the mainstream leaving behind the community. Clearly, this is inadequate considering the bulk of the data on Palestinian-Americans presented in this article. Traditional assimilation theories would advocate this position. Scholars like W. Lloyd Warner, Leo Srole and Milton M. Gordon would argue that the ethnic community or enclave poses a hindrance to assimilation and upward mobility (2005; 1964). The insinuation is that the greater the distance between the individual immigrant and the ethnic group, the more successful he/she is. This has since been revised, whereby it is recognized that the enclave can facilitate economic mobility (particularly Koreans) (Alba and Nee, 2005). Yet, the unit of analysis is still the individual's economic success, which tells us little about the actions of the politically stigmatized.

The second generation is preserving the community's boundaries despite the potential costs at the personal level, but they did not demonstrate in public for nearly five years (and there have only been two large demonstrations in the last two years). The

way I tried to make sense of this contradiction in the present paper is by adapting Charles Tilly's concept of a trust network noted by the "ramified interpersonal connections, consisting of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, and failures of individual members." (2005, p. 12). Viewing Palestinian-Americans in New York and New Jersey as a trust network brings in rationality of the collective rather than the individual sort. The first generation migrated as a trust network to the U.S., held on its members, but could not transmit the exiled identity until 9/11. US-born Palestinian-Americans could not relate to the sense of exile given that they were raised in mixed neighborhoods where most of their friends were economic immigrants. It took a personal trauma and experience with discrimination for a sense of exile to emerge in the second generation.

The community's strong ties, dense investments in one another, and ensuing points of control provide weight to the argument that the survival of the group took primacy in this political milieu. It also allows one to propose that pro-Palestinian or anti-war demonstrations were viewed as potentially dangerous to the collective. When asked, the second generation lacked a unified response, but the gist was that the value of public protest was limited. One couple complained that the media showed them merely as traffic jams without acknowledging their claims or struggles. While a young man explained that the Iraq war overshadowed the Palestinian strife. Finally, a second-generation comedian outside of the immediate community concurred that demonstrations were not achieving the desired results for the community and thus he had decided to use comedy to speak out politically. He succinctly captured the state of the community and its cleavages when he said, "each uses the tools available to [him/her] to defend and improve the image of Arabs and Muslims." Applied to the wider community, one could propose that the tools available to the second generation were mobilized individually in the interest of the collective.

In terms of voting, most of the second generation will be of voting age in the coming election. In 2004, many families discussed the election, but 2008 will be the time the second generation has the ability to go to the polls. Political discussions on the merits of the candidates are commonplace, both in gatherings and through email. I do not have specific figures on actual participation, but the discussion has mainly been in support of Barack Obama. Some second-generation members have thought-out reasons for supporting Obama and others simply admit that their older siblings or parents told them to vote for him. The discussions around the elections are telling of where Palestinian-Americans view themselves in the American landscape. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is central to their decision-making, although they feel they need to be flexible in their assessments. Both first and second-generation community members are quick to distance themselves from American foreign policy and purport that neither Democrats nor Republicans will support the Palestinian cause. Instead, they look for candidates who seem disinterested or partially sympathetic.

As such, they find Obama to be more sympathetic to Palestinians than Clinton (Republican candidates are left out of the discussion). To a great extent, this is based on his race. As one-second generation man explained his support, "He is a black man, he knows how it feels to be interrogated every day of his life." Statements made by Obama that demonstrated solidarity with Israel and criticized Palestinians were swiftly dismissed as political tactics and not reflective of his true sentiments (Sweet, 2007). Another

implication of the overwhelming support for Obama is that he is the son of an immigrant himself, which alludes to their identification with American minority politics. Some acknowledged the limitations of support for the Palestinian issue, but felt that if they were only interested in Palestine, then they would not be voting at all. Actual participation at the polls remains to be seen.

Conclusions

The article started with an historical comparison between German, Japanese, and Palestinian/Arab-Americans based on their relationship to the government during three of America's international wars. The historical comparison was valuable in contextualizing the present conflict and the government's reaction to "enemies within." It has been argued that the government's use of control mechanisms in the Palestinian/Arab-American community resemble more closely those employed towards German-Americans than Japanese-Americans, because of the prolonged tenure and geographic dispersal across the United States of the general Arab-American and Palestinian-American populations.

Arabs are legally, but not socially, "white." The civil rights movement closed the gap between the whiteness of German-Americans and the darker skin of Arabs. Furthermore, blatant racialization used against Japanese-Americans was inadmissible in a post-1964 world. While "race" was not an issue, creation of "the other" had an impact. The "othering" or racialization that occurred was based on/justified by al-Qaeda's diffuse membership (nation-state based rather than race in the strict sense). Nativist voices and some media outlets evoked the notions of a foreign culture and religion opposed to American democracy, but this was not stipulated into legislation.

Beyond context, the historical comparison to German and Japanese-Americans is unable to provide a measure for assessing intergenerational dynamics. In fact, one might be able to use evidence from the Palestinian-American case to speculate about the dynamics that took place in previous eras. In other words, instead of determining the process through the outcome as much historical literature does, the present case can be used as a model to understand the negotiations that might have occurred within German and Japanese-American populations during World Wars One & Two. In all three cases, the government was using its control over coercion, capital, and commitment to intercept and incorporate populations deemed potentially threatening to national well being.

Finally, the bulk of data and analysis from the NY-NJ Palestinian-American community reaches two conclusions: a.) transmission of an exiled identity is not automatic and requires the second generation to experience "othering;" and b.) that individual-level choices in such immigrant communities are mitigated by internal negotiations. The 9/11- backlash first illuminated the differences between naturalized first-generation and American-born second generation Palestinian-Americans. However, as members of a trust network, they viewed the threat more collectively than as a threat at the personal level, thus, and mobilization ensued to protect the boundaries of the community. Some members were lost on the way, but most searched for and found a medium where they could preserve the community without rejecting their American-ness. This was made possible through juxtaposing the narratives of exile and American minority. Speaking in 2003, Khalid, a first generation immigrant quoted at the beginning of this article, was justified in feeling that "everything is bad" in terms of becoming a

suspect community. By 2008, however, the community proved that it could weather most of the bad and draw its members closer together.

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